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A B S T R A C T
The concept of compulsion, in which addictive behaviour is said to be carried out against the will, is central to
the disease theory of addiction and ubiquitous in modern deﬁnitions. The aims of this article are: (i) to describe
various meanings of compulsion in the literature; (ii) to compare the part thought to be played by compulsion in
addiction with its suggested role in obsessive-compulsive disorder; (iii) to critically examine the place of com-
pulsion in inﬂuential neurobiological accounts of addiction; (iv) to summarise the empirical evidence bearing on
the usefulness of the compulsion concept, evidence that seems at ﬁrst sight incompatible with the notion of
compulsion. This is followed by a discussion of which possible meanings of compulsion can survive an empirical
test and what role they might play in understanding addiction, paying particular attention to a distinction
between strong and weak senses of compulsion. A conclusion is that addictive behaviour cannot be considered
compulsive at the time it is carried out, though other possible meanings of compulsion as an explanation or
description of addictive behaviour and experience are discussed. Among other conclusions, it is suggested that,
although in some senses of the term it may seem arbitrary whether or not ‘compulsion’ should be retained, its use
has important consequences for the public understanding of addiction, and is likely to deter people's attempts to
overcome their addictions and their chances of success.
1. Introduction
The concept of compulsion is at the core of the disease view of
addiction. In the disease view, it is the compulsive nature of addictive
behaviour that distinguishes it from non-addictive behaviour. To say
that an addict's behaviour1 is compulsive is to say, in respect of their
addiction, that they are not free to behave other than they do; they have
no choice in the matter or, at least, their ability to choose is severely
constrained by the eﬀects of their disease of addiction. In this way
compulsive behaviour represents a kind of defect of the will (Wallace,
2003); in some fashion, addictive behaviour is carried out against the
will of the addicted person. This is in contrast to the behaviour of people
who do not suﬀer from the disease of addiction and whose behaviour is
assumed to reﬂect, in some way, the operation of their free will. In the
development of addictive behaviour, the onset of compulsion marks the
turning point from normal, recreational drug use to addictive drug use.
Thus, in his ‘manifesto’ for the brain disease model of addiction,
Leshner (1997) writes: “Initially, drug use is a voluntary behavior, but
when that (metaphorical) switch is thrown, the individual moves into
the state of addiction, characterized by compulsive drug seeking and
use” (p. 46, parentheses added). In relation to so-called behavioural
addictions, to call a behaviour ‘compulsive’ immediately aligns it with
substance-related forms of addictive behaviour (e.g., Kraus,
Voon, & Potenza, 2016; Maraz, Griﬃths, & Demetrovics, 2016).2 In
short, it is compulsion that makes addictive behaviour addictive.
Compulsion also serves an essential socio-political purpose for the
disease of addiction. It is because addictive behaviour is compulsive
that addicts should not be blamed or punished for the transgression of
legal and social norms associated with their addictive behaviour but
should instead receive compassion and treatment, when indicated, for
their disease. This appeal to compassion and access to treatment is, of
course, the basis of longstanding and continuing communications from
advocates of the disease theory of addiction to the general public and
policy-makers. Indeed, despite the origins of the disease theory of
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.abrep.2017.05.002
Received 6 September 2016; Received in revised form 9 May 2017; Accepted 14 May 2017
☆ To appear in “Free Will and Addictive Behaviour”, Special Issue of Addictive Behavior Reports edited by Anthony C. Moss, Roy Baumeister &Marcantonio Spada.
E-mail address: nick.heather@northumbria.ac.uk.
1 I am aware that many people object to the term ‘addict’, agree that those who suﬀer from what are conventionally known as addictions are individual human beings whose lives
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2 In this article I shall sometimes makes reference to drug addiction or drug use but the reader should bear in mind that, depending on the context, addiction to activities like gambling,
aberrant sexual behaviour, internet use, shopping, etc., is often intended too.
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addiction at least 200 years ago (Levine, 1978), it is still promoted as a
mark of liberal and enlightened opinion to believe that addiction really
is a disease and that suﬀerers from it ‘can't help’ behaving (i.e., are
compelled to behave) the way they do. We may note in passing that,
despite the appeal of this rationale for a compassionate response to
addiction based on the idea of compulsion, it has not generally suc-
ceeded in persuading Anglo-American law to withhold criminal re-
sponsibility from addicts who break law of the land (Morse, 2017).
Although, as we have seen, crucial for a disease view of addiction
and hence for the dispute about whether or not addiction is best viewed
as a disease, the notion of compulsion is also accepted by many who
reject the disease theory. An inﬂuential book by a pioneer of objections
to the idea of addiction as a biological disease (Peele, 1985) is subtitled,
“Compulsive experience and its interpretation”. A neuroscientist who
disagrees that addiction is a disease (Lewis, 2017) nevertheless believes
that, in its late stages, addiction is characterised by compulsive urges.
Bruce Alexander (2008), who sees addiction as an adaptation to so-
ciocultural dislocation, refers to it as a compulsive lifestyle. Other ex-
amples of non-disease uses of compulsion could be provided. The
conclusion is that the concept of compulsion is ubiquitous in modern
thinking about the nature of addiction.
1.1. Loss of control
In modern writing on addiction as a disease, the idea of compulsion
assumes a central place. However, in earlier writings on alcohol ad-
diction, then called ‘alcoholism’, a similar concept was prominent and
this should not be forgotten in a discussion of compulsion. This was the
concept of ‘loss of control’ over drinking, which had formed the cor-
nerstone of the disease theory of alcoholism from its origins in the early
19th Century to its reformulation by Alcoholics Anonymous following
the repeal of National Prohibition in the USA in 1933 and subsequent
adoption by the medical profession (see Heather, 1991). As in the
concept of compulsion, inherent in this concept of loss of control is the
idea that alcoholic drinking is ‘against the will’ of the victim of a hy-
pothetical disease process. This is shown most clearly in a famous
quotation from Jellinek's (1960) foundational text for the modern dis-
ease concept of alcoholism:
Recovered alcoholics in Alcoholics Anonymous speak of ‘loss of
control’ to denote that stage in the development of their drinking
history when the ingestion of one alcoholic drink sets up a chain
reaction so that they are unable to adhere to their intention to ‘have
one or two drinks only’ but continue to ingest more and more – often
with quite some diﬃculty and disgust – contrary to their volition (p.
41, italics added).
Loss of control was divided into two kinds of compulsion: ‘inability
to abstain’ in which the drinker is unable to refrain from starting to
drink after a period of abstinence, and ‘inability to stop’ in which the
individual is unable to stop drinking during a single session or keep to
limits previously set (Marconi, 1959), as in Jellinek's example above.
The latter kind of loss of control is central to the view of alcohol ad-
diction taken by Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), epitomised by the slogan
‘one drink, one drunk’. AA is concerned with the alcoholic's desire to
drink between drinking sessions but refers to this as an ‘obsession’ with
drinking rather than loss of control per se (see Crowther, 2017).
Following evidence collected during the 1960s and 1970s which
cast doubt on the validity of the ‘chain-reaction’ form of loss of control
(see below), the concept was watered down by disease theorists by the
introduction of an element of unpredictability in the appearance of loss
of control. Keller (1972) proposed that alcoholics had not lost control
over drinking but could never be sure that, once started, they would be
able to stop; Ludwig and Wikler (1974) referred to a relative inability to
regulate alcohol consumption; and, in the alcohol dependence syn-
drome, control was seen as “variably or intermittently impaired rather
than ‘lost’” (Edwards, 1982, p. 29). Depending on the kind in addiction
in question, the idea of impaired control, as a more reﬁned version of
the compulsion concept, can presumably be applied in somewhat dif-
ferent ways to all addictive behaviours.
1.2. Aims of this article
Despite extensive references to it in the literature on addiction, it is
by no means clear what role compulsion is supposed to play in addic-
tion. As Segal (2017a) has emphasised, diﬀerent authors mean diﬀerent
things by the term (p. 450). Does it apply to the behaviour itself or to
the experience accompanying or preceding addictive behaviour? Does
it characterise drug seeking, drug consumption, or both? Is it supposed
to be an essential characteristic of addiction or one that applies only to
some, presumably more severe forms of it? Above all, is compulsion in
some sense of the term required for an adequate explanation of ad-
diction or is its role merely descriptive? If descriptive only, is the de-
scription accurate? It is questions of this kind that this article will at-
tempt to answer.
Before proceeding, it may be necessary to make one thing clear. In
analysing the concept of compulsion and thus leaving open the possi-
bility that this concept will be found wanting as an explanation or
description of addictive behaviour and experience, there is no intention
whatever in this article to trivialise addiction. The author recognises
that the consequences of severe addiction are devastating and tragic in
nearly all spheres of human life. Alcohol addicts drink themselves to
death despite the eﬀorts of family, colleagues, neighbours and friends;
nicotine addicts continue to smoke despite warnings from their surgeon
that limb amputation will be necessary unless they quit; gambling ad-
dicts destroy their family's ﬁnances and leave themselves and their
loved ones destitute and desperate. In addition to death, disease, mental
and social damage, all forms of addiction can lead to terrible feelings of
shame and self-loathing (Flanagan, 2013).
The great mystery of addiction is that these consequences normally
occur with the full awareness of the addicted individual. So why do
addicts persist in their addictive behaviour despite knowing what harm
it is doing to their lives and the lives of others? It is not enough to
answer this question by saying it is because addicts are compelled to
behave that way without attempting to further specify what compulsion
means; to fail to do so is merely to restate the central puzzle of ad-
diction. It is also not enough to say that addictive behaviour is ‘against
the will’ without further specifying what this means (see Segal, 2017a,
2017b). It is obvious that some addicts do not stop their addictive be-
haviour before devastating harm has been done. The question is why
this happens. Again, it is not enough to say that it is because they ‘can't
stop’ without trying to say why they can't stop. It is that task of further
speciﬁcation that this article is aimed at assisting.
1.3. Structure of the article
The article will be divided into six sections. In the ﬁrst, in addition
to those meanings that have already been noted, various meanings of
compulsion will be examined in the literature on deﬁnitions of addic-
tion, in classical philosophy, and in modern dictionary deﬁnitions of
compulsion. This section will conclude by identifying two possible
senses of compulsion which, it is claimed, help to clarify how it has
been attempted to explain addiction in the literature. Then, the part
thought to be played by compulsion in addiction will be compared with
its suggested role in obsessive-compulsive disorder. In the third section,
the place of compulsion in inﬂuential neurobiological accounts of ad-
diction will be critically examined. Next, having previously set out the
various possible meanings and theoretical forms compulsion can take,
we will examine the behavioural and phenomenological evidence
bearing on the usefulness of the compulsion concept. This will be fol-
lowed by a discussion of which possible meanings of compulsion can
survive an empirical test and what role they might play in addiction
theory. The article will conclude with an opinion on what part the
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compulsion concept can play in the eﬀort to improve the societal re-
sponse to addictive disorders.
2. Meanings of compulsion
2.1. Compulsion in deﬁnitions or characterisations of addiction
In modern times, addiction (WHO, 1950) or dependence (WHO,
1969) have been deﬁned by the World Health Organization (WHO) as
compulsion to take drugs. For example, in an oft-quoted passage, WHO
(1969) deﬁned dependence,3 a term with which it wished to replace
addiction, as follows:
… a state psychic and sometimes also physical, resulting from the
interaction between a living organism and a drug, characterised by
behavioural and other responses that always include a compulsion to
take a drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order to experience
its psychic eﬀects, and sometime to avoid the discomfort of its ab-
sence (p. 6, italics added).
Of the abundance of other deﬁnitions of addiction or dependence in
the literature that refer to compulsion as its central feature or as one of
them, only a few representative examples will be given. For Leshner
(1997) the essence of addiction is “compulsive drug-seeking and use,
even in the face of negative health and social consequences” (p. 46). In
similar vein, the Wikipedia entry for addiction, doubtless viewed by
many hundreds of people per day, is: “Addiction is a medical condition
characterized by compulsive engagement in rewarding stimuli, despite
adverse consequences” (Wikipedia, 2016). These deﬁnitions, and the
many others in the literature like them, do not themselves give us any
idea what kind of thing compulsion is. Also, these typical deﬁnitions
allow the interpretation that it is possible to have a compulsion without
this necessarily being accompanied by harmful or destructive con-
sequences; compulsion here is apparently something more than con-
tinuing to engage in a behaviour despite knowledge of harmful con-
sequences.
On the other hand, the Institute of Medicine (1996) says that drug
addiction consists of “drug seeking behaviour involving compulsion
(and) resulting in substantial impairments in health and social func-
tioning” (p. 19), thus making clear that compulsion and harm coincide
in addiction. And from a leading psychiatric researcher on addiction
and a former Director of the National Institute of Mental Health in the
USA, we have:
The term compulsion is imprecise, but at a minimum implies di-
minished ability to control drug use, even in the face of factors (e.g.,
illness, failure in life roles, loss of job, arrest) that should motivate
cessation of drug use in a rational agent willing and able to exert
control over behavior” (Hyman, 2007, p. 2).
This ‘minimal’ deﬁnition equates compulsion with impaired control
over drug use, in whatever form such impaired control is thought to
take. We shall return to an evaluation of this minimal characterisation
of compulsion towards the end of this essay.
2.2. Compulsion in classical philosophy
Stephens and Graham (2009, pp. 206–7) have provided a useful
summary of the locus classicus for philosophical discussions of com-
pulsion in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle says4:
“These things, then, are thought involuntary which take place under
compulsion or owing to ignorance: and that is compulsory of which
the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is
contributed by the person who is acting… [for example] if he were
carried somewhere by a wind or by men who had him in their
power. … What sort of acts, then, should be called compulsory? We
answer that, without qualiﬁcation actions are so when the cause is
in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing.”
Thus, in Aristotle's sense of the term, compulsion can be said to be
present only when the causes of the behaviour are external to the
person, the paradigm case being that of someone being blown along by
a wind ‘against his will’ and regardless of any internal state that might
apply to him at that moment. Stephens and Graham (2009) add that it is
in the spirit of Aristotle's understanding of compulsion, if not the letter,
to include as compulsion an ‘internal’ state such as brain damage
leading to someone not being able to speak; the person might desire to
speak but is compelled by a force outside her desires to be mute. The
key point is that compulsion removes control of behaviour from the
person's own motivational states (see Stephens & Graham, 2009). Is
addictive behaviour compulsive in this way? Let us call this the strong
version of the nature of compulsion in addiction.
2.3. Dictionary deﬁnitions of compulsion
Across a range of dictionaries, there are two kinds of deﬁnition of
compulsion, one referring to a want and the other to a force. For ex-
ample, the Cambridge English Dictionary http://dictionary.cambridge.
org/dictionary/english/compulsion gives: (i) a very strong feeling of
wanting to do something repeatedly that is diﬃcult to control, and (ii) a
force that makes you do something. The full deﬁnition of compulsion
from Miriam Webster is: 1a) an act of compelling - the state of being
compelled; 1b) a force that compels; 2) an irresistible persistent impulse
to perform an act …; also, the act itself.
One of these kinds of deﬁnition, that concerning force, is equivalent
to the strong sense of compulsion in Aristotle's writings just reviewed.
The other, referring to strong desire, can be found throughout the lit-
erature on addiction, beginning with 19th century depictions of ‘habi-
tual drunkenness’ as being due to ‘a burning withering desire for drink’
that was ‘overwhelming’, ‘overpowering’ and ‘irresistible’ (Room,
Hellman, & Stenius, 2015). Are addicts' desires for their substance or
activity like this? However strong, irresistible, etc., such desires are
thought to be, they refer to the person's motivational states at the time
of acting, and, in contrast to Aristotle's strong sense of extra-personal
compulsion described above, can be called a weak version of compul-
sion in addiction.
2.4. The strong and weak senses of compulsion
A modern equivalent of Aristotle's wind that blows someone along
the street, or more accurately the internalised version of that image
(Stephens & Graham, 2009), is the concept of automaticity, a topic that
has been studied intensively by psychologists for the last 40 years
(Schneider & Chein, 2003). The basic proposition is that human cog-
nition consists of two diﬀerent types of information processing – au-
tomatic and controlled (or non-automatic). This has led to what is
commonly known as the dual process theory of human cognition and
the assumption that overt behaviour eventuates from the interplay
between automatic and controlled cognitive processes
(Evans & Frankish, 2009). An automatic process can be deﬁned as a
cognitive-behavioural sequence that “nearly always becomes active in
response to a particular input conﬁguration,” and that “is activated
automatically without the necessity for active control or attention by
the subject” (Schneider & Shiﬀrin, 1977, p. 2). Automatic processes
are the result of highly repetitive learning experiences and are char-
acteristic of most human daily activities, implying that, with suﬃcient
3 In this article I mostly use the terms ‘dependence’ and ‘addiction’ synonymously.
However, I prefer ‘addiction’, partly because of the confusion due to ‘physical depen-
dence’, as exempliﬁed in the change made to DSM-5, but mostly because it conveys the
sense of enslavement to a substance or activity that is essential to a proper understanding
of the disorder in question (see Heather, 2017a).
4 The quotes to follow are taken from the translation of The Nichomachean Ethics of
Aristotle by Sir David Ross (1971, Book III, Section 1, pp. 48–52).
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practice, performance on any task, from tooth brushing to piano
playing, can become automatic. In contrast, a controlled process refers
to behaviour that is “activated under control of, and through attention
by, the subject” (Schneider & Shiﬀrin, 1977, p. 2–3). Controlled pro-
cesses are limited in capacity but this is balanced by the fact that they
can be easily established and varied in response to novel situations for
which automatic sequences of behaviour have never been learned.
The ﬁrst application of the automatic/non-automatic distinction to
addiction was in a classic paper by Tiﬀany (1990). He begins by re-
jecting the dominant tradition in theories of addiction up to that time in
which craving was seen as its essential deﬁning characteristic and was
used to explain the initiation and maintenance of compulsive addictive
behaviour, as well as relapse after a period of abstinence. All such
theories assume, says Tiﬀany, that craving and urges are necessary for
the production of drug seeking and consumption. However, there is
evidence from follow-up studies of addicts who have gone through a
treatment programme and have relapsed that drug use is not necessarily
preceded by urges or cravings. The alternative hypothesis developed by
Tiﬀany is that psychological processes supporting drug-use behaviour
can operate independently of those that control craving and urges and
can be derived from the concept of automatic processes. Tiﬀany writes:
“I contend that drug-use behavior in the addict represents a con-
stellation of speciﬁc skills involving drug acquisition and drug
consumption. Over a history of repeated practice, the cognitive
systems controlling many aspects of drug procurement and con-
sumption take on the character of automatic processes. That is,
much of the drug-use behavior of the addict may become largely
automatized. Thus, drug-use behaviors tend to be relatively fast and
eﬃcient, readily enabled by particular stimulus conﬁgurations (i.e.,
stimulus bound), initiated and completed without intention, diﬃcult
to impede in the presence of triggering stimuli, eﬀortless, and en-
acted in the absence of awareness” (p. 154).
In Tiﬀany's model, rather than being the proximate causes of ad-
dictive behaviour, urges and cravings are supported by non-automatic
cognitive processes and activated in parallel with drug-use behaviour.
Two kinds of situation are described in which non-automatic craving
and urge-responding are invoked: (a) an environmental situation im-
pedes or blocks the drug-use action plan in someone who is not at-
tempting to avoid drug use (abstinence avoidance), or (b) non-auto-
matic cognitive processes are invoked in an attempt to impede or block
a drug use action plan (abstinence promotion). The latter kind of si-
tuation is relevant to the key issue of relapse and Tiﬀany clearly states
his view that relapse to addictive behaviour can occur in the absence of
self-reported urges (i.e., automatically). Abstinent addicts may be par-
ticularly prone to relapse when their attention is distracted by some
other task, environmental stimuli that trigger the automatic drug-use
action plan are present and the drug is readily available. Indeed, Tiﬀany
hypothesises that absent-minded relapses, entailing little or no con-
current activation of non-automatic processes, constitute “a substantial
proportion of relapse episodes” (p. 163) and regards this as one of
several crucial tests of his model.
For present purposes, Tiﬀany's (1990) model of the role of auto-
matic processes in addiction represents a clear illustration of the strong
version of compulsion. The opposing weak version can be represented,
in general terms, by the view of addiction that Tiﬀany rejects – the one
that views addictive behaviour as preceded and caused by craving and
drug urges, including importantly the precedents and causes of relapse
to drug use after a period of abstinence or non-harmful use. We may
think of the ﬁrst as a strong version of compulsion because the onset of
an automatic processes is both necessary and suﬃcient for relapse to
addictive behaviour to occur. In weak version, while non-automatic
processes in the form of craving and urges are necessary for relapse,
they may not be suﬃcient depending on whether or not one believes
that such craving and urges are literally irresistible.
It was shown above that there are many possible meanings of
compulsion and some of these are listed in Table 1. (It is not claimed
that this table covers all meanings of compulsion that have appeared in
the literature, only some of the more prominent.) Unfortunately, in the
absence of additional speciﬁcation, most of these meanings do not
convey any explanatory or even, in some cases, descriptive power. The
proposal here is that the strong-weak distinction provides a way of
classifying accounts of compulsion in addiction that do have ex-
planatory potential. Strong theories of compulsion are those based on
‘aberrant learning’ while weak theories are those based on strong mo-
tivational states of the addict (see Stephens & Graham, 2009). So, in
weak versions, compulsion is regarded as the result of abnormal mo-
tivation to use or seek drugs; in strong versions, drug-related cues
trigger compulsive drug-use and -seeking independently of any moti-
vational states that may be present because the person's normal moti-
vational control over behaviour has been disabled.5
3. Obsessive-compulsive disorder and addiction
The psychiatric disorder in which compulsion is most obviously
implicated is obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and it is important
for present purposes to consider similarities and diﬀerences between
the concept of compulsion as applied to OCD and to addiction. The
results of this exercise will hopefully throw light on the nature of
compulsion in addiction.
First, compulsive acts in OCD take the form of repetitive or ritua-
lised behaviour, like hand-washing or other cleaning, repeated
checking, and excessive and unnecessary orderliness and tidiness
(World Health Organisation, 1993; ICD-10, F42.1). The overt behaviour
is usually accompanied by anxiety based on a perceived danger to
which the individual is either subject or may be the cause of, the ritual
act being an ineﬀective or symbolic attempt to avert the danger.
Compulsive acts such as this typically take up many hours of the suf-
ferer's day. Similarly, the drug consumption of addicted persons is
Table 1
Meanings of compulsion in the addiction literature.
Addictive behaviour is carried out against the will, or contrary to the volition, of the
addicted person (various).
The onset of compulsion marks the turning point from normal, recreational drug use
to addictive drug use (Leshner, 1997).
Because of compulsion, suﬀerers from the disease of addiction ‘can't help’ breaking
legal and social norms (various).
In its late stages, addiction is characterised by compulsive urges (Lewis, 2017).
Addiction is a compulsive lifestyle (Alexander, 2008).
A drinker is unable to refrain from starting to drink after a period of abstinence (loss
of control 1) (Marconi, 1959).
A drinker is unable to stop drinking during a single session or keep to limits
previously set (loss of control 2) (Jellinek, 1960).
Control over drinking is variably or intermittently impaired (impaired control)
(Edwards, 1982).
Addiction is characterised by behavioural and other responses that always include a
compulsion to take a drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order to
experience its psychic eﬀects, and sometime to avoid the discomfort of its
absence (WHO, 1969).
Addiction is compulsive drug-seeking and use, even in the face of negative health and
social consequences (Leshner, 1997).
Addiction consists of drug seeking behaviour involving compulsion (and) resulting in
substantial impairments in health and social functioning (Institute of Medicine,
1996).
Compulsion … implies diminished ability to control drug use, even in the face of
factors … that should motivate cessation of drug use in a rational agent willing
and able to exert control over behaviour (Hyman, 2007).
Compulsion is due to automatic (learned) drug-use action plans to seek and take
drugs (Tiﬀany, 1990).
Compulsion is due to non-automatic and irresistible (or diﬃcult to resist) cravings
and urges to seek and take drugs (various).
5 For other discussions of addiction relevant to the distinction between strong and
weak senses of compulsion, see Watson (1999), Wallace (2003) and Levy (2006).
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highly repetitive, often ritualised and time-consuming.
A possible diﬀerence, however, is that, while both addiction and
compulsive acts involve reinforcement, in addiction the desire to use a
substance or engage in an activity is based on the expectation that the
behaviour will be positively reinforced (i.e., result in hedonic reward).
In older models of addiction, based mainly on the tolerance and with-
drawal found in heroin addiction, addictive behaviour was thought to
be maintained by negative reinforcement, i.e., the relief gained from
reducing painful withdrawal symptoms and craving (Wikler, 1965).
Following the cocaine ‘epidemic’ of the 1980s and for a variety of other
reasons, this model was largely replaced by an understanding of ad-
diction emphasising positive reinforcement (Stewart, de
Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984). However, it is now still strongly argued that
addiction centrally involves both positive and negative reinforcement
(e.g., Baker, Piper, McCarthy, Majeskie, & Fiore, 2004) or that negative
reinforcement dominates positive reinforcement in later stages of ad-
diction (Koob, 2009). So, while in addiction both positive and negative
reinforcement probably play an important part, in OCD it is universally
assumed that the suﬀerer's expectation is that compulsive behaviour
will be negatively reinforced (i.e., result in relief from tension or an-
xiety).
In the comparison between OCD and addiction, as well as compul-
sive behaviour we also need to consider compulsion as reported ex-
perience. Although they were by no means the ﬁrst to make the link
between addictive drinking and OCD, one of the elements in Edwards
and Gross' (1976) classic delineation of the alcohol dependence syn-
drome was ‘subjective awareness of compulsion to drink’. The syn-
drome idea was extremely inﬂuential in the history of treatment for
alcohol dependence, was later extended to other drugs (Edwards,
Arif, & Hodgson, 1982), and was incorporated in DSM-IV (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The DSM-IV version is often appealed to
as a way of demonstrating that harmful forms of a behaviour like
gambling can be thought of as addictions (Grant & Odlaug, 2014).
Edwards and Gross (1976) propose subjective awareness of a com-
pulsion to drink as a more accurate representation of the dependent
drinker's phenomenology than descriptions based on of ‘loss of control’
and ‘craving’:
The conventional phrases (loss of control and craving) used to de-
scribe the dependent person's subjective experience are not alto-
gether satisfactory…Perhaps the key experience can best be de-
scribed as a compulsion to drink, and, though the analogy between
alcohol dependence and compulsive disorder has not been con-
sidered satisfactory in the past, the subjective experience of de-
pendence may come close to fulﬁlling the classic conditions for a
diagnosis of compulsion. The desire for a further drink is seen as
irrational, the desire is resisted, but the further drink is taken...It is
the feeling of being in the grip of something foreign, irrational, and
unwanted which for severely dependent patients seems to be the
private experience which is so diﬃcult to convey (p. 1060).
In a later publication Edwards (1982) describes the compulsion to
drink more explicitly as analogous to the “hand washing of a compul-
sive neurosis” (p. 29). This analogy seems to be in the spirit of the
strong sense of compulsion identiﬁed above; the experience is of
something alien and outside personal wishes and desires. Yet on closer
inspection, the similarities between the subjective experience in ad-
diction and in OCD are less obvious. Drawing from the literature on
clinical descriptions of OCD, Caetano (1985), in a careful and pains-
taking analysis, reveals several crucial diﬀerences between the two
kinds of experience. Caetano concludes:
… while the struggle against a recurring element of consciousness
may be experienced by (alcohol) dependent persons, obsessions or
compulsions cannot be deﬁned solely by this feature. When the
subjective experience of the need to drink is examined in the light of
other phenomenological characteristics, it fails to meet the
requirements for diagnosis as an obsession or a compulsion. … it is
not an impediment to eﬀective action; its content cannot be seen as
genuinely senseless; it is perceived as expressing a need of the self
which is not present in obsessed patients; and the internal resistance
it triggers does not lead to defensive compulsive rituals (Caetano,
1985, p. 468, parentheses added).
Edwards' (1982) analogy between dependent/addictive drinking
and compulsive hand-washing may therefore be misplaced. While there
may be superﬁcial similarities, compulsion in OCD and addiction ar-
guably reﬂect quite diﬀerent phenomenological qualities. This raises
the possibility that, pace Edwards, the experience of ‘compulsion’ in
addiction may be no more than a strong, or exceptionally strong, desire.
The question whether the forms compulsion is alleged to take in ad-
diction and in OCD are similar or diﬀerent will continue to be asked in
this essay.
4. Neurobiological theories of addiction
The role of compulsion in addiction has been described in the var-
ious neurobiological theories of addiction that have been developed
over the last 20 years or so, although this role diﬀers between theories.
With the exception of the work of Nora Volkow and her colleagues (see
below), these theories are founded mainly on animal models of addic-
tion. Owing to the high prestige of neuroscience in today's society,
accounts of compulsion in these theories are probably the most inﬂu-
ential to be found in the scientiﬁc literature and deserve careful at-
tention here. In this section we will consider some of the leading the-
ories, and summarise and comment on the way that compulsion is
described therein.
4.1. Everitt and Robbins' aberrant learning theory
In this theory, addiction is seen as the endpoint of a series of
transitions from voluntary drug-taking, through habitual use, to
compulsive use (Everitt & Robbins, 2005). The theory assumes that
there are two kinds of learning relevant to understanding addiction –
action-outcome (A-O) learning and stimulus-response (S-R) or habit
learning. Initially, voluntary drug use is controlled by expectations
users have about the outcomes or consequences, usually hedonic
pleasure, of their drug-seeking and drug-taking actions and hence
learn to carry out those actions in order to experience those rewards
(A-O learning); the user is aware of her expectations and the moti-
vation to seek and use drugs. Eventually, however, over repeated self-
administrations, the user learns to associate certain stimuli (e.g.,
people or settings associated with drug use, drug-using paraphernalia,
etc.) with reward and these stimuli become conditioned reinforcers
that maintain drug-seeking behaviour (S-R learning). This learning is
mostly implicit (i.e., the user is unaware of the connection between
drug cues and expectations of reward) and in this way drug-seeking
becomes largely ‘automatic’ and independent of the user's conscious
preferences and motivations. Eventually, after yet more drug self-ad-
ministrations, these over-learned habits become so automatic that
they can be called compulsive. It is important to note that both kinds
of learning are thought to occur in parallel during the user's drug-
taking career but eventually, in habitual and compulsive drug use, S-R
learning comes to dominate behaviour.
These transitions in drug-taking and -seeking behaviour are re-
ﬂected by a transition at the neural level from control predominantly by
the prefrontal cortex to control by the striatum in the forebrain and, at
the same time, a progression of control from ventral to more dorsal
domains of the striatum, i.e., increased excitation of dopamine neurons
in the dorsal sub-region of the striatum. In addition to the eﬀects of
repeated self-administrations, these neural transitions may also be the
result of changes to cognitive executive functioning brought about di-
rectly by the eﬀects of chronic drug ingestion itself.
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In theoretical terms, compulsive behaviour is characterised as “a
maladaptive stimulus-response habit in which the ultimate goal of the
behavior has been devalued so that the behavior is not directly under
the control of the goal” (p. 1485). With regard to subjective experience,
Everitt and Robbins (2005) write:
Crucial to drug addiction is the persisting quality of these habits,
which has been likened to the subjective state of ‘wanting’, but
which we would suggest corresponds more obviously to the sub-
jective state of ‘must do!’—although this subjective response could
arise post hoc as a rationalisation of the ‘out-of-control’ habitual
behavior rather than being the driving inﬂuence (p. 1485).
The comment here about ‘post hoc rationalisation’ is interesting and
will be returned to below. As Everitt and Robbins themselves say,
however, “habitual responding by itself … does not capture the per-
sistent, indeed, compulsive aspects of ‘out-of-control’ drug bingeing;
some additional factor seems to be required.” Although it applies to
drug-bingeing and ‘inability to stop’, it is not clear in Everitt and
Robbins' description of their theory what this additional factor is
thought to be.
A familiar analogy employed to illustrate the change from con-
scious, voluntary behaviour to non-conscious, involuntary behaviour is
learning to drive a car; the novice is uncomfortably aware of his
movements and lack of co-ordination until with practice driving be-
comes something automatic which he does not need to think about (see,
e.g., Duhigg, 2012). However, in case critics of their theory might think
that this is being suggested as an analogy with drug-taking and drug-
seeking per se, Everitt and Robbins say that “… it is not an example of a
procedural skill, such as playing the piano or tying one's shoe-
lace—although it is plausible that such skills result from even more
extended training. The analogy with drug addiction would be a per-
sistence or constant re-initiation of such activities” (p. 1485). Here it is
stressed that addictive behaviour entails the ‘constant re-initiation’ of
automatic behaviour similar to playing the piano, tying one's shoelace
or, presumably, driving a car.
In terms of the distinction made earlier between strong and weak
versions of the concept of compulsion in addiction, it is clearly the
strong version, based on automatic behaviour outside the agent's mo-
tivational control, that marks aberrant learning in this theory. In this
respect, Everitt and Robbins' theory is a continuation of the tradition of
thinking about addiction prompted by Tiﬀany's (1990) seminal article.
Moreover, the key distinction among contemporary theories of addic-
tion is whether compulsion is seen primarily as evidence for a disorder
of learning and memory, implying automatic behaviour, or of motiva-
tion, implying disordered desires or appetites (see Berridge & Robinson,
2011).
4.2. Koob and Le Moal's allostatic dysregulation theory
This theory proposes that brain changes occurring during the tran-
sition from drug use to addiction account for the addict's persistent
vulnerability to relapse long after drug-taking has ceased (Koob,
Ahmed, Boutrel, et al., 2004; Koob & Le Moal, 2001). Addiction is said
to result from a cycle of progressively increasing dysregulation of brain
reward systems that eventuate in compulsive use, loss of control over
drug-taking and spiralling distress. This dysregulation involves diﬀerent
sources of reinforcement, diﬀerent neuro-adaptive mechanisms, and
diﬀerent neurochemical changes to the brain reward system but, cru-
cially, alterations in the mesolimbic dopamine system, opioid pepti-
dergic systems, and brain and hormonal stress systems provide the
negative emotional state (e.g., dysphoria, anxiety, irritability) when
access to the drug is prevented that drives addiction.
With prolonged consumption of addictive drugs, sensitisation to
drug-related stimuli and counter-adaptive processes that are part of a
normal homeostatic limitation of reward function, such as the opponent
process described by Solomon and Corbit (1974), fail to return to the
normal range and instead form an ‘allostatic’ state. Allostasis is the
process of maintaining stability by successive changes in brain reward
mechanisms but, with the eﬀects of continued drug-taking and with-
drawal, this stability cannot be maintained. Thus, these allostatic brain
changes represent a chronic and pathological deviation of reward set-
point, fuelled not only by dysregulation of reward circuits but also by
the activation of autonomic nervous system and hormonal stress re-
sponses induced by the extended amygdala and representing the so-
called ‘dark side’ of addiction (Koob, 2009). The manifestation of this
allostatic state as compulsive drug-taking and loss of control over drug-
taking is thought to be based on activation of brain circuits such as the
cortico-striatal-thalamic loop, similar to the neural mechanism de-
scribed in Everitt and Robbins' (2005) theory.
In this way, the Koob and Le Moal theory describes the brain
changes hypothesised to result in compulsive drug use, but how is
compulsivity itself portrayed? In addition to the usual statements that
one of the deﬁning properties of addiction is a compulsion to seek and
take drugs, mentions of compulsivity are replete in the writings of Koob
and his collaborators and it is variously characterised. For example,
“Compulsivity in addiction can derive from multiple sources, including
enhanced incentive salience, engagement of habit function, and im-
pairment in executive function. However, underlying each of these
sources is a negative emotional state that may strongly impact on
compulsivity” (Koob, 2009, p. 27). Consistent with this underlying
source, drug addiction is said to involve a progression from impulsivity
to compulsivity, with a concomitant shift from positive reinforcement
to negative reinforcement driving the motivated behaviour
(Koob & Volkow, 2010). Thus, a negative aﬀective state contributes to
compulsivity through negative reinforcement mechanisms (i.e., beha-
viour reinforced by the termination or reduction of the negative af-
fective state). In later writings, fuller deﬁnitions of compulsivity are
oﬀered. Compulsivity is:
“…deﬁned as elements of behavior that result in perseveration in
responding in the face of adverse consequences, perseveration in
responding in the face of incorrect responses in choice situations, or
persistent re-initiation of habitual acts (Everitt & Robbins, 2005).
The elements of compulsivity are represented in many of the
symptoms outlined in DSM-IV: continued substance use despite
knowledge of having had a persistent or recurrent physical or psy-
chological problem and a great deal of time spent in activities ne-
cessary to obtain the substance (American Psychiatric Association,
2000)” (Koob & Volkow, 2010, Table 1, p. 218).
The reference to ‘perseveration’ and to Everitt and Robbins' (2005)
paper in this quotation, together with the appeal elsewhere to the idea
of the ‘automaticity’ of addictive behaviour, appears to align the Koob
and Le Moal understanding of compulsivity in addiction with that of
Everitt and Robbins' aberrant learning theory of addiction (see above).
Despite the presentation of the Koob and Le Moal theory as a motiva-
tional model of addiction, this suggests the strong version of compul-
sion in which compulsion exists independently of the agent's motiva-
tional states. On the other hand, the earlier depiction of compulsion as a
consequence of the attempt to relieve a negative emotional state, as-
suming that animal models for this state can be equated with a human
desire to feel better, aligns the theory with the weaker version of
compulsion identiﬁed in this essay. The conclusion is that the allostatic
dysregulation theory contains elements of both the strong and weak
senses of compulsion.
4.3. Robinson and Berridge's incentive-sensitisation theory
This theory begins with an assumption, derived mainly from neu-
robiological research on nonhuman animals, that addictive drugs have
in common the ability to enhance dopamine transmission in the me-
solimbic dopamine system of the brain, a system known to be involved
in reward and motivation for natural, appetitive reinforcers. The main
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psychological function of this neural system is to attribute ‘incentive
salience’ to the perception and mental representation of a certain class
of stimuli or events, where incentive salience is the psychological
process that imbues stimuli with salience and makes them attractive
and sought-after (see also, e.g., Robinson & Berridge, 2001). In some
individuals, the repeated use of addictive substances results in incre-
mental neuro-adaptations in this system, rendering it increasingly and
persistently hypersensitive (i.e., ‘sensitised’) to drugs and drug-asso-
ciated stimuli. Although sensitisation is not just a conditioned response,
it is triggered by a process of associative (Pavlovian) learning, which
causes excessive incentive salience to be attributed to drugs and asso-
ciated stimuli. Sensitisation of incentive salience is therefore the spe-
ciﬁc mechanism hypothesised to transform ordinary desires for drug
experiences into drug craving. Incentive sensitisation is also responsible
for relapse to drug use, even after protracted periods of abstinence and
the cessation of withdrawal phenomena. Thus, the theory proposes that
“the deﬁning characteristics of addiction (craving and relapse) are due
directly to drug-induced changes in those functions normally subserved
by a neural system that undergoes sensitisation-related neuro-adapta-
tions” (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, p. 250).
An important part of the theory, and one essential to understanding
the role that compulsion plays in it, is the distinction between ‘wanting’
and ‘liking’ drugs and drug experiences. The sensitisation of incentive
salience is termed drug ‘wanting’ but the accompanying changes in
neural systems can occur independently of changes in other neural
systems mediating the subjective, pleasurable (hedonic) eﬀects of
drugs, called drug ‘liking’. As a consequence, incentive sensitisation can
produce compulsive drug-taking and -seeking even when the expecta-
tion of drug pleasure (or relief from the aversive properties of with-
drawal) is reduced and even in the face of strong disincentives, such as
the loss of reputation, job, home, family and other harms of addictive
behaviour. Evidence is cited from both human and animal studies
against the idea that drug taking is necessarily motivated by the sub-
jective pleasurable eﬀects of drugs, i.e., subjective pleasure is not ne-
cessary for the maintenance of drug-seeking and drug-taking behaviour
in addiction. Although in normal behaviour, including recreational
drug use, ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ coincide, as the development of addic-
tion proceeds they become increasingly dissociated. Moreover, “the
attribution of incentive salience is not a conscious process and the in-
trospective experience of ‘wanting’ or craving is only a person's inter-
pretation of the outcome of that process. Much of the time the attri-
bution of incentive salience may be more implicit than explicit”
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993, p. 267). The authors continue:
… the addict can be only subjectively aware of the outcome of ex-
cessive incentive salience attribution, craving. The addict may have
little insight into the reason for the craving and indeed, may himself
be bewildered by its intensity. At a conscious level addicts may re-
count all of the negative consequences of continued drug use, de-
plore their situation, even comment that the drug does not continue
to give great pleasure - and not understand why their craving per-
sists (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, p. 267).
While in the description of the theory in numerous articles and
chapters the role played by compulsion is of the generic kind, roughly
equivalent to continued use despite harm, the above quotation gives a
more speciﬁc meaning to compulsion in the theory - the addict's ex-
perience of feeling driven to continue the activity without under-
standing their motivation for doing so and the sense of bewilderment
this experience gives rise to. However, although the addict may not
understand their motivation for craving drugs, it is nevertheless ex-
cessive motivation to seek and consume drugs brought about by in-
centive sensitisation that is the basis for describing addiction as com-
pulsive. As Stephens and Graham (2009) assert, it is this aspect of
compulsion in the theory that makes it incompatible with the classical
meaning of compulsion derived from Aristotle (see above) and with an
understanding of compulsion centred on automaticity.
4.4. Goldstein and Volkow's iRISA theory
Nora Volkow, the Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse in
the USA, has made many distinctive contributions to neuroscientiﬁc
research on addiction. One strand of research and theory arises from a
collaboration with Rita Z. Goldstein and the development of a model6 of
addiction they call impaired response inhibition and salience attribution
(iRISA) (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002, 2011). Unlike the other theories of
addiction summarised above, this is based primarily on neuroimaging
studies with human subjects.
The starting point for the iRISA theory is that previous theories had
focussed primarily on the limbic, subcortical ‘reward’ centres of the
brain but the role of structures in the prefrontal cortex had been ne-
glected. While subcortical circuits may be crucial to the rewarding ef-
fects of drugs and the initiation of drug self-administration, the state of
addiction also involves disruption of cortical circuits that inhibit or
modulate compulsive behaviour and drive. Goldstein and Volkow
(2002) propose an integrated model of drug addiction, based on neu-
roimaging studies, that embraces the addictive cycle of intoxication,
bingeing, withdrawal and craving. The orbitofrontal cortex and the
anterior cingulate gyrus, which are anatomically connected with limbic
structures, are activated during intoxication, craving and bingeing and
de-activated during withdrawal. These cortical regions are also in-
volved in higher-order cognitive and motivational functions concerned
with the attribution of salience to reinforcers, as inﬂuenced by context
and expectation, and with the control and inhibition of prepotent re-
sponses. In addiction, dysfunction of these and other prefrontal regions
results in the overvaluing of drug reinforcers, the undervaluing of al-
ternative reinforcers, and deﬁcits in inhibitory control of drug re-
sponses. These changes, summarised as iRISA, are hypothesised to en-
large upon the traditional understanding of addiction emphasising
limbic-regulated responses to pleasure and reward.
With regard speciﬁcally to compulsion, Goldstein and Volkow
(2002) write as follows:
… we propose that the behaviours and associated states that are at
the core of drug addiction are distinctly the processes of loss of self-
directed/willed behaviours to automatic sensory-driven formulas
and attribution of primary salience to the drug of abuse at the ex-
pense of other available rewarding stimuli. We hypothesise that
these states are ﬁrst evoked in the presence of the drug of abuse or
cues conditioned to the drug but then become chronic action ten-
dencies, contributing to relapse/bingeing (behavioural compulsion)
and withdrawal/craving (mental compulsion, i.e., obsessiveness),
respectively (p. 1643).
In an earlier article, Volkow and Fowler (2000) expand on their
view of addiction as ‘a disease of drive and compulsive behaviour’ and,
in a striking passage, stress that pleasure per se cannot account for
compulsive drug intake:
An analogy that may be useful to explain the dissociation of pleasure
from drug intake in the addicted subject could be that occurring
during prolonged food deprivation when a subject will eat any food
regardless of its taste, even when it is repulsive. Under these cir-
cumstances the urge to eat is not driven by the pleasure of the food
but by the intense drive from the hunger. It would therefore appear
that during addiction the chronic drug administration has resulted
in brain changes that are perceived as a state of urgency not dis-
similar to states that are observed on (sic) states of severe food or
water deprivation. However, diﬀerent from a state of physiological
urgency for which the execution of the behaviour will result in sa-
tiety and termination of the behaviour, in the case of the addicted
subject the disruption of the orbitofrontal cortex coupled with the
6 As will be obvious, I make no distinction here between the terms ‘theory’ and ‘model’.
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increases in DA elicited by the drug set a pattern of compulsive drug
intake that is not terminated by satiety and/or competing stimuli (p.
323).
In a later article, Goldstein and Volkow (2011) present a much
more complex and intricate model of addiction and of the role of
cortical structures and functions within it. However, there are pro-
minent references to habitual, automatic, stimulus-driven behavioural
patterns, involving impairments to self-control mechanisms, atten-
tional bias towards drug-related stimuli and away from other stimuli
and reinforcers, and inﬂexibility in goals to procure the drug (see, e.g.,
Table 1, p. 654). In this connection it should be noted that other in-
ﬂuential articles by Volkow, written with diﬀerent collaborators, give
a somewhat diﬀerent perspective on compulsion in addiction. For
example, Kalivas and Volkow (2005) assert that, “A primary beha-
vioral pathology in drug addiction is the overpowering motivational
strength and decreased ability to control the desire to obtain drugs”
(p. 1403), i.e., the weak, desire-based, motivational form of compul-
sion rather than the automatic, amotivational, strong kind that is
dominant in Volkow's papers with Goldstein. Volkow and Li (2004)
say simply: “Drug addiction manifests as a compulsive drive to take a
drug despite serious adverse consequences. This aberrant behaviour
has traditionally been viewed as bad ‘choices’ that are made vo-
luntarily by the addict. However, recent studies have shown that re-
peated drug use leads to long-lasting changes in the brain that un-
dermine voluntary control” (p. 963).
5. Evidence causing diﬃculties for compulsion in addiction
We will now consider a number of types of evidence that cause
diﬃculties for the idea that addictive behaviour and experience is
compulsive. Much of this material is familiar to serious students of
addiction but reasons for summarising it here are twofold. First, it
provides an opportunity to gather together in one place various strands
of evidence relevant to compulsion that are scattered throughout the
literature on addiction. Secondly, despite what any reasonable person
must regard as the direct relevance of this evidence to the issue of
compulsion, it seems to have had little eﬀect on contemporary, public-
facing and ‘oﬃcial’ portrayals of addiction. As made clear in the in-
troduction to this essay, it is now standard language to present addic-
tion as a disease characterised by compulsion and, even in non-disease
accounts, compulsion is ubiquitous. It is perfectly legitimate, of course,
to defend the validity of putting compulsion at the centre of a portrayal
of addiction but any defence worthy of respect must take into account
the evidence that will be reviewed in this section.
One way to assess the relevance of this evidence to compulsion in
addiction is to reﬂect whether evidence of a similar kind would also
cause diﬃculties for the role of compulsion in a condition like OCD in
which compulsion plays an obvious part. This will be done in appro-
priate places.
5.1. Addictive behaviour is operant behaviour
Perhaps the type of evidence that most obviously causes diﬃculty
for compulsion in addiction is the demonstration that addictive beha-
viour is operant behaviour. This is a term associated originally with the
radical behaviourism of B. F. Skinner (1953) and, in a well-known
quotation, is deﬁned as behaviour that is “shaped and maintained by its
(environmental) consequences” (Skinner, 1972, p. 23, parentheses
added); in other words, it refers to behaviour that is inﬂuenced by, or is
‘contingent upon’, the events that follow it. Operant behaviour is also
called ‘instrumental learning’ and ‘operant conditioning’, the kind of
learning identiﬁed by Skinner as being distinct from classical or ‘Pav-
lovian’ conditioning of automatic reﬂexes. In contrast to classically-
conditioned responses, operant behaviour refers for all practical pur-
poses to voluntary and intentional action that is directed towards the
attainment of expected rewards and that is ‘reinforced’, or made more
likely to recur, by the receipt of those rewards. If addictive behaviour
really is a form of operant behaviour, it is diﬃcult to see, prima facie,
how it can be called compulsive in any simple or straightforward sense.
5.1.1. Alcohol addiction
A considerable body of experimental evidence put together during
the 1960s and 1970s by Mello, Mendelson, and their colleagues (e.g.,
Mello, McNamee, &Mendelson, 1968; Mello &Mendelson, 1965, 1972;
Mendelson &Mello, 1966) showed conclusively that the drinking of
even the most chronic and severe alcohol addicts, or ‘alcoholics’, was
operant behaviour. These experiments and other relevant evidence
were summarised by Heather and Robertson (1983, Chapter 3). We will
consider this evidence at some length because it has clear and direct
relevance to the place of compulsion in addiction but this relevance
seems to have been forgotten in current literature on the topic.
A typical set-up in these experiments is that diagnosed alcoholics
were given free access to an operant apparatus at any time during the
day or night over periods of about two weeks. Participants could obtain
either a single shot of whisky or the money equivalent by pressing a
translucent key that changed colour according to a random sequence of
reinforcement schedules (Mello &Mendelson, 1965). In another ex-
periment, the key-pressing task was replaced by one more attractive to
participants – earning points that could be exchanged for alcohol or
money by keeping a model car on the road in a driving machine
(Mendelson &Mello, 1966).
In later research by the same team, the emphasis was on the cost of
alcohol among alcoholic participants, with cost deﬁned as the amount
of work (e.g., the number of consecutive correct key presses) required
to obtain a reward (Mello et al., 1968). The main ﬁnding here was that
the amount of alcohol consumed, inferred from participants' blood al-
cohol levels, was a predictable function of the degree of eﬀort required
to obtain it. Mello and Mendelson (1972) studied alcoholics' drinking
behaviour over longer periods than in the previous experiments – 30 or
62 days. A key observation was that, despite the occurrence of partial
withdrawal symptoms, participants did not immediately start drinking
in the attempt to abolish them but preferred to continue working to
amass more tokens that could be exchanged for alcohol. Another ob-
servation was that, among those who were studied for 62 days, none of
18 participants drank all the alcohol available despite the absence of
any kind of limitation on consumption, and tokens that could have been
exchanged for large amounts of alcohol were handed back at the end of
the experiment.
Following the precedent set by the Mello and Mendelson team of
giving alcohol to alcoholics for research purposes, many other re-
searchers made important contributions during the 1970s to our un-
derstanding of the actual drinking behaviour of alcoholics (see
Heather & Robertson, 1983, Chapter 3, for review). Especially sig-
niﬁcant was an ingenious experiment by Miriam Cohen, Liebson,
Faillace, and Speers (1971) who were also interested in cost factors.
Here, however, the target behaviour was abstinence and the broad aim
of the research was to determine what reinforcement contingencies
were necessary to ‘buy’ abstinence from male chronic alcoholics.
This was done by examining interactions between cost and two other
important variables – a priming dose of alcohol and a delay in
reinforcement. Participants were allowed to purchase a relatively
large quantity of alcohol every third day of the experiment and on
subsequent days were oﬀered a certain amount of money to abstain
for the entire day. If the participant did not abstain the incentive was
increased on the next occasion but if he abstained it was decreased.
The immediate result was that abstinence could be bought from
each of the four participants for varying amounts ranging from $7 to
$20.
From this base, the eﬀects of the two experimental manipulations
were examined and both showed the same pattern of ﬁndings. A delay
in reinforcement disrupted abstinence such that the amount of money
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previously eﬀective in buying it no longer worked. However, increasing
the amount of the reward was able to reinstate abstinence. Similarly, a
priming dose of alcohol given on the morning of the day on which
payment for abstinence was to be oﬀered disrupted abstinence on that
day but increasing the magnitude of monetary reinforcement re-estab-
lished it. This latter ﬁnding is especially noteworthy because it suggests
how the idea of loss of control over drinking could have arisen – be-
cause a priming dose of alcohol disrupted the choice of abstinence that
had previously been made – while suggesting that this apparent loss of
control was an illusion – because control over drinking and the choice
of abstinence could be reinstated by a suﬃciently large incentive.
Bearing this in mind, we may conclude as follows. First, in a si-
tuation in which they were able to determine the volume and pat-
terning of their own drinking, none of the participants in these ex-
periments, who would all qualify for a diagnosis of alcohol
dependence under DSM-IV criteria or severe alcohol use disorder
under DSM-5, attempted to drink themselves into a state of un-
consciousness or even drink all the alcohol available to them with
little eﬀort on their part. This is not to deny, of course, that drinking to
oblivion never occurs in the natural environment but it does show that
a compulsion to drink to severe intoxication does not predictably occur
in alcohol addicts. Secondly, the participants in these studies clearly
showed control over their drinking in a range of ways. For example,
they drank in order to maintain high but roughly constant blood al-
cohol concentrations; they did not drink continuously but sponta-
neously initiated and terminated drinking sessions; some chose to
taper-oﬀ their drinking in order to avoid or reduce withdrawal
symptoms or chose to work to accumulate alcohol rather than drink to
abolish withdrawal symptoms. All these observations are inconsistent
with a straightforward interpretation of compulsion in the sense of an
inability to stop drinking once started or an uncontrollable and irre-
sistible craving to continue drinking until forcibly prevented from
doing so. In case these meanings of compulsion are thought to be
‘straw men’, they are both frequently encountered in the literature on
the disease concept of alcoholism and on the notion of compulsive
drinking as the key feature of alcoholism.
The most general ﬁnding from these experiments that appears to go
against the validity of compulsion is that the amount of alcohol con-
sumed by alcohol addicts in a free-choice laboratory situation was a
direct function of the cost of alcohol, as measured by the degree of
eﬀort required to obtain it. One does not have to be a radical beha-
viourist, and to subscribe to the Skinnerian view that it is only ob-
servations of external behaviour that count as science, to realise the
signiﬁcance of this. It shows drinking by alcohol addicts is, as stated,
operant behaviour that is largely determined by its consequences. The
particular reinforcement contingencies applying to the drinking beha-
viour of chronic alcohol addicts obviously show marked diﬀerences
from those applying to non-alcohol addicts – self-evident from the ex-
istence of markedly diﬀerent drinking practices. But what these ﬁnd-
ings do clearly demonstrate is that, rather than being compelled and
qualitatively diﬀerent, alcohol addicts' drinking behaviour is subject to
the same laws that govern normal, goal-directed, voluntary behaviour
of any sort.
5.1.2. Cocaine addiction
Following the experimental demonstration in the 1960s and 1970s
that alcohol addiction consisted of operant behaviour, similar principles
were applied to the study of cocaine addiction in the 1990s. During the
previous decade, the ‘cocaine epidemic’ had given rise to considerable
public and governmental concern, particularly in the USA, and this
resulted in a focus of research on cocaine addiction. Stephen Higgins
(1997) reviewed evidence available at that time bearing inter alia on the
following key assumptions: (i) cocaine use is an instance of operant
behaviour; (ii) the degree of behavioural control that cocaine exerts as a
reinforcer is malleable and dependent on environmental context; and
(iii) increasing the availability of alternative, non-drug reinforcers is
one contextual alteration that can signiﬁcantly disrupt the acquisition
and maintenance of cocaine use and abuse. Of particular interest to
present concerns, Higgins showed that, in experimental studies in non-
humans and humans, in laboratory and clinic settings, with diﬀerent
routes of cocaine administration, and with recreational and addicted
human cocaine users, cocaine use can be decreased signiﬁcantly by
increasing the availability of alternative reinforcers. As before, these
observations are inconsistent with any straightforward, ‘loss of control’
interpretation of compulsion in addiction.
A demonstration of the ability of alternative reinforcers to modify
cocaine use in ‘experienced cocaine smokers’ was carried out by Hart,
Haney, Foltin, and Fischman (2000). The six participants in these
experiments were volunteers recruited from the community in New
York City who were not seeking treatment. However, all reported al-
most daily use of smoked cocaine, were currently spending between
$100 and $500 per week on cocaine, had been convicted of cocaine-
related crimes in the past and had arranged their lives around their
cocaine habit; they would all almost certainly meet DSM criteria for
drug dependence or substance use disorder. Following previous work
reviewed by Higgins (1997) showing that cocaine self-administration
could be modiﬁed by the availability of alternative reinforcers (see
above), the immediate aim of the experiment was to assess whether
money vouchers or merchandise vouchers were more eﬀective as an
alternative to cocaine. However, it can serve here as a detailed de-
monstration of the limitations of the compulsion concept when ap-
plied to what was then, and still often is, reputed to be one of the most
addictive forms of human drug use ever witnessed (i.e., ‘crack co-
caine’).
In an inpatient setting, a six-trial choice procedure was used with
sessions consisting of one sample trial, in which participants received
the cocaine dose and the alternative reinforcer available that day, and
ﬁve choice trials where they chose between the available cocaine dose
and the alternative reinforcer. There were eight sessions in each of
which a dose of cocaine (0, 12, 25, 50 mg) was paired with a money
voucher that could be exchanged for $5 at discharge or a $5 mer-
chandise voucher. Trials were presented at 14-minute intervals and the
beginning of a trial was indicated to the participant by a visual cue (two
squares) on a video screen. Each of the two squares served as a dis-
criminative stimulus to indicate the availability of either the stipulated
dose of cocaine or the alternative reinforcer. Using a computer ma-
nipulandum, participants selected the left (cocaine dose) or the right
(alternative reinforcer) option, and fulﬁlled the response requirement
by pressing the keyboard spacebar 200 times. Once the response re-
quirement was satisﬁed, and assuming that vital signs were within safe
criteria for drug administration, a cocaine dose or alternative reinforcer
was administered.
The basic ﬁnding from this experiment was that money vouchers
were a more eﬀective alternative reinforcer than merchandise vouchers
among these crack cocaine users. What is more interesting for present
purposes however is ﬁrstly that, despite the fact that these experienced
cocaine smokers chose to self-administer more cocaine doses per ses-
sion as the cocaine dose increased, they frequently rejected the choice
of a lower dose of cocaine in favour of an alternative. Moreover, this
often occurred after they had received a ‘taste’ of the drug in the
sampling session, which under the conventional disease view of ad-
diction would presumably have elicited an irresistible craving for more.
Secondly, the type of alternative reinforcer available diﬀerentially in-
ﬂuenced cocaine self-administration, i.e., participants chose to self-
administer signiﬁcantly less cocaine when a money voucher was the
alternative compared to when a merchandise voucher was available,
showing that whether or not cocaine is chosen depends on its speciﬁc
environmental consequences. What seems remarkable about these
ﬁndings is that, among these individuals who in the mainstream media
and in many conventional scientiﬁc and professional circles would be
regarded as hopelessly addicted to their drug of choice, a relatively
small amount of money (a maximum of $50 per day if the alternative
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reinforcer were consistently chosen) could be eﬀective in persuading
them to reject the choice of cocaine.
5.1.3. Nicotine addiction
The concept of operant behaviour also applies to nicotine addiction,
although the evidence on which this conclusion is based is not experi-
mental but studies of the relationship between smoking and cost. Gallet
and List (2003) reviewed economic surveys showing that cigarette
smoking responds to monetary contingencies. They concluded that
raising prices by 1% reduces consumption by about 0.4% and that,
generally speaking, when smokers' income rises they smoke more.
Moreover, in these times of widespread bans on indoor smoking, going
outdoors to smoke must be more unpleasant in winter than summer and
it would therefore be expected that smokers would reduce their
smoking during the cold months. Indeed, Momperousse, Delnevo, and
Lewis (2007) found that cigarette sales in New Jersey were 37% lower
in February than in June. As pointed out by Baumeister and Vonasch
(2015), the fact that smoking is sensitive to price changes and other
kinds of cost indicates that rational calculations inﬂuence behaviour
and that impulses to smoke can be resisted. So too, compliance with
smoking restrictions is generally high, which could not be the case if
urges to smoke were truly irresistible and compulsive.
5.1.4. Summary
We have seen in this section that three major classes of addictive
behaviour, involving addiction to alcohol, cocaine and nicotine, are
examples of operant behaviour in the sense that they are responsive to
environmental contingencies; when the consequences of the behaviour
change, so does the behaviour. Could the same apply to OCD? While it
is possible that the compulsive behaviour of the OCD suﬀerer could be
temporarily changed by altering response contingencies (cf. Lyvers,
2000), it seems very unlikely that the kind of changes seen in the la-
boratory experiments described above would occur in OCD.
5.2. Contingency management programmes
A possible objection to the evidence just reviewed on alcohol and
cocaine responses is that it is restricted to the artiﬁcial situation of the
controlled experiment, with little relevance to the real world and,
especially, to the treatment of addictive disorders outside the labora-
tory. This objection is contradicted by a large amount of evidence that
treatment based on the principles of operant conditioning is perhaps the
most eﬀective way of helping people to change addictive behaviour.
The treatment in question is known as ‘contingency management’
(CM). This refers to a form of behaviour therapy in which tangible
positive reinforcers are provided to people with substance use disorders
contingent on objective evidence, usually in the form of biological
specimens, of abstinence from the substance in question. A type of re-
inforcer widely studied is the provision of vouchers exchangeable for
goods and services following evidence of abstinence from cocaine by
urinalysis (Higgins, Delaney, Budney, & Bickel, 1991). In programmes
of this kind, the value of the reinforcer typically increases with suc-
cessive abstinence but resets to a minimum value if a positive test oc-
curs. A less expensive kind of CM programme uses prize-based re-
inforcement (Petry, Martin, Cooney, & Kranzler, 2000), in which
patients are permitted to draw from a bowl containing slips of paper
with a chance of winning prizes of varying amounts. Alternatively,
clinic privileges may be used as reinforcement, where the privilege
could be access to a take-home dose in a methadone programme (e.g.,
Stitzer, Iguchi, & Felch, 1992).
A large number of randomised controlled trials have been carried
out to assess the eﬃcacy of CM among addicted individuals. As an
example, Silverman et al. (1996) randomised cocaine-addicted patients
of a methadone programme to either a voucher CM group or to a yoked-
control in which patients received vouchers at the same rate and
magnitude as those in the contingent group but regardless of urinalysis
results. Almost half of those in the CM group achieved two or more
months of continuous abstinence compared with none in the control
group.
CM has been applied and evaluated in relation to all the major
substance addictions – cocaine, methamphetamine, opioids, alcohol,
marijuana, and nicotine (see Petry, Alessi, & Rash, 2011, p. 233) and is
also being applied to problem gambling (Petry, 2010a). At least three
independent meta-analyses have found CM to be eﬃcacious in bringing
about drug abstinence (Benishek, Dugosh, Kirby, et al., 2014; Lussier,
Heil, Mongeon, Badger, & Higgins, 2006; Prendergast, Podus, Finney,
Greenwell, & Rolf, 2006) and CM was one of only two psychosocial
treatments recommended by the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) (2007) in the UK for the treatment of problems re-
lated to illicit drug use. A review and meta-analysis of psychosocial
interventions in general (Dutra et al., 2008) found CM to be the most
eﬃcacious type of intervention for substance use disorders.
There have been various criticisms of CM over the years based on
ethical, health economic or other practical considerations (see Petry,
2010b). It has also been alleged that the beneﬁcial eﬀects of CM dis-
appear when the provision of reinforcers comes to an end, though there
is some evidence of longer-term eﬀects beyond the termination of
contingencies (see Petry et al., 2011, p. 235). These objections may
have restricted the practical implementation of CM in treatment ser-
vices across the world (Petry, 2010b) but they are not of immediate
concern here. Whatever the ethical or other criticisms and whether or
not beneﬁts are only temporary, the evidence on CM strongly supports
the conclusion in the previous section that addictive behaviour is op-
erant in nature and not compulsive in the sense of behaviour that is
impervious to its consequences. The fact that CM is such an eﬃcacious
treatment method gives an indication of the power of reinforcement
contingencies, as distinct from the alleged power of compulsive urges,
over addictive behaviour.
CM has been used in the treatment of OCD but only for the purpose
of increasing compliance with the requirement of treatment, not for
addressing the disorder itself (Kircanski, Peris, & Piacentini, 2011).
Cognitive-behavioural treatment for OCD is not based on operant
principles, the treatment of choice being response prevention.
5.2.1. Contingency management in special populations
Even more impressive than the outcomes of CM-based treatment
reviewed above are the results of programmes based on CM principles
that have been applied to special populations of addicted individuals.
As a prime example, Physicians' Health Programs (PHPs) that began in
the USA over 40 years ago have produced remarkable rates of recovery
among physicians addicted to a range of substances who were in danger
of losing their licenses to practice (see DuPont, McLellan, White,
Merlo, & Gold, 2009). In return for ongoing support, physicians sign
ﬁve-year contracts agreeing that they will complete treatment, often
12-step based, and submit to intensive random monitoring to ensure
they remain abstinent from any use of stipulated psychoactive
drugs, including alcohol. If physicians relapse to any use of substances
or show other evidence of noncompliance with the programme, there
follows an immediate intervention usually consisting of removal from
medical practice and placement in extended treatment followed by
more intensive monitoring. (For more details of PHPs, see DuPont et al.,
2009).
A review of the case-notes of 904 physicians admitted to PHPs, 88%
of whom met criteria for a diagnosis of substance dependence, reported
that 78% had no positive test for either alcohol or other drugs over the
5-year period of intensive monitoring and that 72% were continuing to
practice medicine (Dupont et al., 2009). Such rates of fully successful,
long-term treatment outcomes are unheard of in reviews of conven-
tional addiction treatment programmes. A similar case management
system has been applied to other professions, including other health-
care occupations, commercial airline pilots and lawyers.
An obvious objection to the signiﬁcance of these high success rates
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in PHPs is that physicians are ﬁnancially well-oﬀ and highly educated,
with access to the best health insurance; they would therefore be likely
to do well in any kind of treatment regime. In response to this objection,
DuPont and Humphreys (2011) describe two programmes based on
similar CM principles but applied in the criminal justice system (CJS).
The CJS population contains some of the heaviest drug users with very
poor prognoses, imposing unusually high costs on society. Moreover,
while PHPs are expensive, the CJS programmes in question have severe
constraints on funding and are similar in this respect to conventional
treatment for addiction.
One such programme is Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with
Enforcement (HOPE) which manages convicted oﬀenders likely to vio-
late their conditions of community supervision. Common drug pro-
blems in this population involve smoked crystal methamphetamine and
intravenous opioids. In the HOPE programme, probationers are in-
formed by the judge that they will be subject to intensive random drug
testing similar to that used by the PHPs. Violations of probation rules,
including any drug or alcohol use, missed drug tests and missed ap-
pointments, are met with certain, swift and short-term incarceration.
Rather than intensive and often prolonged treatment as used in PHPs, in
HOPE participants may choose whether or not to attend treatment and
only a small proportion do so at the outset. The remainder are mon-
itored without treatment but those who fail monitoring are then re-
ferred to treatment. The programme can last up to six years.
The HOPE programme was compared with standard probation in a
randomised controlled trial by Hawken and Kleiman (2009). After a
year, HOPE probationers were 55% less likely to be arrested for a new
crime, 72% less likely to use drugs, 61% less likely to miss appoint-
ments with their supervisory oﬃcers, and 53% less likely to have their
probation revoked than standard probationers (see
DuPont &Humphreys, 2011, p. 3).
The other CJS programme based on CM principles is the 24/7
Sobriety Project in South Dakota. This is aimed at Driving While
Intoxicated (DWI) oﬀenders nearly half of whom have three or more
DWI convictions and who are therefore likely to include many in-
dividuals meeting standard diagnostic criteria for substance depen-
dence. Like the PHP and HOPE programmes, 24/7 Sobriety uses in-
tensive alcohol and drug testing. However, to accurately monitor
alcohol use, participants must either undergo twice-daily alcohol breath
tests at a local police station or wear continuous transdermal alcohol
monitoring bracelets. Participants also undertake regular drug ur-
inalyses or wear drug patches to detect drug use. Any positive test for
alcohol or other drugs results in an immediate short-term stay in jail
and all missed appointments are immediately followed by the issue of
arrest warrants (see Caulkins & DuPont, 2010).
An evaluation of the 24/7 Sobriety Project found that, among those
participants given twice-daily alcohol breath tests, 66.6% were fully
compliant with the program requirements, never missing a test or
providing a single positive sample; of those subject to transdermal al-
cohol bracelet monitoring, 78% fully abstained from alcohol use.
Recidivism statistics for twice-daily tested oﬀenders showed con-
siderably lower recidivism rates for second time, third time, and fourth
time DWI oﬀenders compared to control oﬀenders (see
DuPont &Humphreys, 2011).
According to Dupont and Humphreys (2011), the unique aspects of
PHPs and similar programmes, and those responsible for their success,
are: (i) they last for years rather than weeks; (ii) they carefully monitor
use of alcohol or other drugs; (iii) they employ swift, certain, and
meaningful consequences for use and non-use of substances. Such
consequences are contrasted with those applying to substance use or
other non-compliance in conventional treatment programmes for of-
fenders which are typically unpredictable, slow and harsh. The results
from HOPE and 24/7 Sobriety show that CM-inspired programmes can
be applied successfully to populations quite diﬀerent from physicians
and with ostensibly much poorer prospects for recovery. The remark-
able success rates from all three programmes are incompatible with a
view of addiction that sees addictive behaviour as compulsive and in
which relapse is seen as an unavoidable feature of the disorder. The
new perspective on addiction treatment based on the CM approach
suggests that the key to long-term recovery lies in sustained changes in
the environment in which decisions to use and not to use substances are
made.
As with the evidence from experimental studies of addictive beha-
viour, it is very diﬃcult to see how these CM-based programmes could
be aimed at the treatment of OCD and achieve anything like the same
rates of success; indeed, it would probably and rightly be regarded as
unethical to make rewards contingent on the non-appearance of
symptoms of OCD.
5.3. The ﬂexibility of addictive behaviour
The idea of compulsion implies that addictive behaviour is in-
ﬂexible, stereotyped, unreﬂective and unresponsive to changes in per-
sonal or environmental circumstances. This is suggested both by or-
dinary usage of the term ‘compulsive’ and by theories like that of Everitt
and Robbins (2005) that explain addictive behaviour by claiming it to
be controlled by the part of the brain responsible for automatic beha-
viour in the form of S-R habits (see above). But is this depiction of
addictive behaviour accurate? We have already seen that evidence on
the operant nature of addictive behaviour casts considerable doubt on
this depiction of addiction but we can also address the question by
examining what addicts tell us about their own behaviour.
Joanne Neale (2002) reported the results from interviews she con-
ducted with 200 drug users, mostly heroin users, in Scotland. The
overall picture of addicts' behaviour emerging from this research is very
diﬀerent from its characterisation as inﬂexible and compulsive. While
drug users' lives could reasonably be described as highly structured and
narrowly focussed, owing to the demands of obtaining an expensive
supply of drugs on a daily basis, the means by which those demands
were met were themselves varied and ﬂexible, not to say innovative and
highly ingenious on occasion. Rather than helpless victims of forces
over which they had little or no control, Neale's respondents were ty-
pically self-respecting and self-determining individuals “who actively
confronted and purposefully responded to external constraints and life
opportunities” (p. 35). This echoes an earlier description of street ad-
dicts in New York City as resourceful ‘economic entrepreneurs’ who
remained alert, ﬂexible and resourceful in order successfully to ‘take
care of business’ (Preble & Casey, 1969).
The idea of compulsion also implies that addicts are obsessionally
focussed on obtaining and using drugs and that their lives are over-
whelmingly dominated by it. However, although most people would
consider addicts' daily existence limited in scope and exhausting given
the time and eﬀort required to obtain drugs, Neale found that they
continued to live ordinary lives in many ways:
Individuals who become addicted to heroin and other opiates do not
stop being children, parents, siblings and friends to other members
of society. Likewise, some still have business to attend to, hobbies
and interests to participate in, and obligations as employees or
students to fulﬁl. Thus, with greater or lesser degrees of success and
failure, drug users must juggle the risks and dangers associated with
opiate use alongside very ordinary daily behaviour and life roles
(Neale, 2002, p. 99).
Neale's description of the realities of drug addiction, based on her
meticulous qualitative research, is supported by many ethnographic
studies and autobiographical accounts of addiction (see, e.g., Heyman,
2009, Chapter 3). (Ethnographic studies are based on direct, participant
observation of behaviour and are not therefore susceptible to any biases
that might be present in addicts' self-reports.) However, it most clearly
applies to drug-seeking behaviour as opposed to drug-taking. De-
pending on the kind of addiction in question, the idea of stereotyped
and automatic behaviour may apply in some respects to acts of ongoing
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drug consumption. ‘Narrowing of the drinking repertoire’, referring to
an increasingly restricted selection of places, times and beverages as
alcohol addiction proceeds, is an element of the alcohol dependence
syndrome delineated by Edwards and Gross (1976); a smoker un-
thinkingly lighting up another cigarette while one is already burning in
an ashtray is a familiar occurrence; and the rituals accompanying in-
travenous drug injection are well known. If this were all addiction
consisted of, then compulsive, stereotyped and automatic might well be
appropriate descriptors. Unfortunately for this point of view, it is the
seeking of drugs or of opportunities for addictive behaviour that is es-
sential to any satisfactory description and explanation of addiction.
It could be that the idea of compulsive addictive behaviour owes
much to laboratory studies of non-human animals on which most
neurobiological theories of addiction are founded, a point that will be
returned to below. As Stephens and Graham (2009) put it: “In the lab,
where experimental design restricts the behavioural options for ob-
taining drugs, it may seem plausible to explain addictive drug-seeking
in terms of direct connections between stimuli and stereotyped re-
sponses. What constitutes drug-seeking behaviour among human ad-
dicts in the wild is seldom so straightforward” (p. 208). Robinson and
Berridge (2003), whose own theory of addiction does not require drug-
seeking behaviour to be compulsive in the automatic sense, agree:
Many aspects of addictive drug pursuit are ﬂexible and not habitual.
Human addicts face a situation diﬀerent from rats that merely lever-
press for drugs. We suspect that if animals were required to forage
freely in a complex environment for drugs the picture seen in animal
neuroscience might look more like the situation in human addiction,
and automatic habit hypotheses would be less tempting. An addict
who steals, another who scams, another who has the money and
simply must negotiate a drug purchase—all face new and unique
challenges with each new victim or negotiation. Instrumental in-
genuity and variation are central to addictive drug pursuit in real
life… Thus, the formation of S-R habits may explain the rituals
addicts display in consuming drugs, but they do not account for the
ﬂexible and deliberate behaviors involved in obtaining drugs (p.
34).
Like addicts, the lives of suﬀers from OCD are no doubt ordinary in
many ways, notwithstanding the interference with daily routines
arising from their disorder. But is it realistic to attribute to OCD suf-
ferers the same kind of ﬂexibility and ingenuity in response to the
demands imposed on them by their condition, in the same way that
heroin users respond to the demands of their addiction? This seems
doubtful.
5.4. The natural history of addiction
If addiction entails compulsive behaviour, it must be expected that
addicts would take a long time to recover, if they ever did. Linked to the
understanding of addiction as a chronic, relapsing disease, compulsion
implies that, in medical terms, the prognosis of the condition is bleak,
as for other disorders involving compulsion such as OCD. But, since this
is presumably an empirical issue, what is the evidence on the natural
history of addiction? Does it conﬁrm the postulation of a chronic,
compulsive condition with a protracted or lifelong course? Fortunately,
the answer to this crucial question is at hand.
Gene Heyman and colleagues have examined data and undertaken
re-analyses from four large-scale, longitudinal, psychiatric epidemio-
logical surveys of the general population in the USA carried out at
various times since 1980 (see Heyman, 2009, Chapter 4; Heyman,
2013; Heyman &Mims, 2017). All these surveys used DSM criteria to
deﬁne substance dependence on licit and illicit drugs and all deﬁned
‘remission’ as an absence of any symptom of dependence during the
year before interview. It should also be noted that all these surveys
were sponsored by prestigious, government-funded bodies, such as the
National institute on Drug Abuse (ironically the most powerful advocate
of the view of addiction as a chronic relapsing brain disease) and were
designed and carried out by the some of the leading psychiatric epi-
demiologists in the USA. The evidence gathered by Heyman from this
impeccable data-source mostly concerns the description of addiction as
a chronic relapsing disease but it is also highly relevant to the related
concept of compulsion as the central feature of addiction.
The immediate ﬁnding of interest is that, among all participants
who had ever met DSM criteria for substance dependence in their
lifetime, between 76% and 83% were in remission at the time of the
surveys. Further, for the great majority of participants, remission was
achieved without the beneﬁt of treatment. It is surely incompatible with
the notion of a compulsive, chronic disease that over three-quarters of
those who had ever suﬀered from it no longer did so, and despite never
having received treatment.
Heyman then examines possible objections to this ﬁnding - reasons
that it might be spurious. First, owing to the relapsing nature of ad-
diction, it is possible that many of those who did not show symptoms
over the past year would relapse in future, thus reducing the true
proportion of those in remission. This is shown to be false simply by the
demonstration that relapse rates are roughly stable over time, i.e., as a
function of the time elapsed since the ﬁrst appearance of symptoms of
dependence (see Heyman &Mims, 2017, p. 392). It is also possible that
rates of remission are biased by the over-inclusion of drugs from de-
pendence on which recovery is thought to be relatively easy, like
marijuana. This too is false because, when drug types are separated,
remission rates for marijuana dependence were no higher than those for
opioids and stimulants. Indeed, a remarkable ﬁnding of the analysis is
that illicit drugs like opioids and cocaine that are generally reputed to
be the most addictive substances available, and therefore the most
compulsive, showed signiﬁcantly earlier remission than alcohol and
nicotine which might be conventionally thought to be less addictive.
Heyman and Mims (2017, p. 391) calculate that more than half of those
who were ever dependent on an illicit drug had remitted by age 30. This
is not to deny, of course, that addiction is never long-lasting but it is to
assert that protracted histories of addiction are the exception rather
than the rule outside the treatment context.
A predictable objection that respondents to the survey were not
telling the truth about their dependence status was also contradicted by
the existence of relationships between self-report data and other vari-
ables that were very unlikely to have occurred if self-reports were in-
valid. Finally, the possibility that the ﬁndings were aﬀected by the
existence of a large number of addicts who were missing from the
surveys is highly unlikely because, for such a thing to occur, the number
of missing addicts would have to have been improbably large (see
Heyman, 2013, p. 46).
In view of the clear demonstration by these ﬁndings that addiction
in the general population is not the chronic, relatively intractable
condition it is purported to be, how did such a notion arise? One
possibility is that, before the large epidemiological studies Heyman
relies on, the majority of statements about the nature and course of
addiction were based on treatment samples. Since the seminal work by
Robin Room on ‘treatment populations and larger realities’ (Room,
1980), it is generally accepted by scholars of addiction that addicts in
treatment are diﬀerent in important ways from those in the commu-
nity. For one thing, they are more likely to suﬀer from other condi-
tions that increase the chance of a poor outcome. In addition to low
personal, social and economic capital (Storbjoerk & Room, 2008), they
are likely to suﬀer from a range of psychiatric comorbidities, including
depression, anxiety states and personality disorders – conditions that
are likely to aﬀect the prospects of recovery from addiction and may
give the impression that their use of drugs is compulsive, in the sense
of impossible to change. On the other hand, addicts in the community
seldom seek treatment for addiction. For all these reasons, it is es-
sential to base an understanding of addiction on large, random sam-
ples that mirror the demographic and other characteristics of the
general population. When this is done, as we have seen, the true
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picture of addiction that results is very far from that of a chronic,
compulsive disease.
The treatment and non-treatment populations do clearly diﬀer in
the extent of comorbidity they show and it is this that Heyman believes
is mainly responsible for the poorer outlook among the former (see
Heyman, 2009, pp. 82–5). It could still be argued, however, that the
longer course of addiction among those in treatment is because they
represent the more severe end of the spectrum of severity and are
therefore more likely to be compulsive addicts (assuming that there are
also non-compulsive addicts). Segal (2017b) has proposed the existence
of a subset of addicts, typiﬁed by the majority of those who attend
Narcotics Anonymous, who show more severe levels of addiction than
others (p. 452). This subset meets six or seven DSM-IV-TR criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) compared to a less severe
subset that meets three to ﬁve (Willenbring, Massey, & Gardner, 2009).
The drug use of these addicts, claims Segal, is not nearly as responsive
to normal incentives as the less severely aﬀected individuals. It is the
severe subset that is presumably hypothesised to be represented more
heavily in treatment samples and, rather than comorbidity or other
factors, accounts for the poorer prognoses of those who receive treat-
ment compared with those who do not. The further implication is that
compulsion, in whatever form it is thought to take, applies only or
mostly to this subset of addicts. More research on this speciﬁc issue
would be most welcome but, even if the addiction severity hypothesis
were correct, it would not show that compulsion is the essence of ad-
diction, only that it is a feature of its more severe forms. It is even
possible that treatment prolongs the course of addiction and delays
recovery, as has been suggested in relation to schizophrenia (Whitaker,
2015).
Finally, it could perhaps be argued that, although the course of
addiction is much shorter than previously thought, behaviour and ex-
perience are still subject to compulsion while it lasts. If so, this would
be compulsion of a mild kind since it would not prevent people from
recovering from, say, heroin addiction in their late 20s and early 30s.
5.5. How do recoveries from addiction occur?
To consider the validity of the compulsion concept, as well as the
natural history and course of addiction, we can consider the nature of
recovery – the main factors inﬂuencing addicts' changes in behaviour
when they give up or radically reduce substance use or other harmful
activities. If addiction were compulsive in the sense of being impervious
to change, we would expect that, expect possibly for miraculous
‘spontaneous’ remissions, recoveries would mainly come about as a
result of treatment, directed presumably at correcting the neurobiolo-
gical basis of the compulsion. However, as we have seen, the majority
of addicts never receive treatment. In that case, therefore, recovery
must be due to extraordinary circumstances involving life events of a
suﬃciently intense and dramatic quality that the powerful force of
compulsive tendencies is able to be overcome.
Is this what we ﬁnd when we study the factors that predict recovery
or when we ask addicts themselves what they believe was responsible
for their recovery? When this is done, a quite diﬀerent story of typical
recovery appears. In the alcohol ﬁeld, it has long been recognised that,
while sudden transformations akin to religious conversions do occur, in
the majority of cases the correlates of recovery are changes in life cir-
cumstances involving marriage, employment, health, and ﬁnance
(Tuchfeld, 1981). For substance use disorders in general, one of the
most common ways in which self-change occurs is by a process de-
scribed as ‘cognitive appraisal’ or ‘cognitive evaluation’, in which the
initiation of change is preceded by a process of weighing up the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of changing substance use and thereby
becoming committed to change (Klingemann, Sobell, Barker, et al.,
2001, p. 23). With regard to addiction, Heyman and Mims (2017)
summarise the evidence:
In-depth interviews with addicts … and memoirs … yield the fol-
lowing correlates of why those who meet the APA criteria for drug
dependence stop or greatly reduce drug use as they age: ﬁnancial
pressures, legal pressures, family pressures, hardships associated
with pursuing illegal and/or stigmatized activities, drug tolerance,
witnessing an overdose, wanting to be a better parent, the desire to
make parents proud rather than embarrassed, involvement in a self-
help group, an awakened spirituality, a new romantic relationship,
the breakup of a romantic relationship, and so on. The material and
emotional costs and beneﬁts of everyday life, including existential
and value laden self-reﬂections, are the correlates of remission from
addiction.
The question inevitably arises, is the same likely to be true of nat-
ural recoveries from OCD? Suﬀerers from OCD presumably experience
the same changes in life circumstances as those described above but this
does not appear to improve their poor prognoses.
5.6. The Vietnam veterans follow-up
There is another important body of evidence that, though not re-
levant to recovery from addiction per se, certainly concerns the issue of
remission from addiction and how this relates to compulsion. Towards
the end of the Vietnam War, the United States government became
alarmed about reports that a large proportion of American servicemen
in Vietnam were addicted to heroin or other drugs. A team of re-
searchers led by Lee N. Robins was commissioned to interview a large
sample of men in Vietnam in order to determine the extent and char-
acteristics of their drug use, and then to follow them up on their return
to the US after discharge in 1971, and discover what had happened to
them and assess the likely impact on treatment services and American
society at large. The results of this investigation by Robins and her
colleagues (Robins, Davis, & Goodwin, 1974; Robins, Helzer, & Davis,
1975) were to have profound implications for our understanding of
addiction.
In Vietnam, servicemen had easy access to high-quality, inexpensive
opiates, with the result that 20% were regular users, with roughly one-
sixth of these regular injectors and the remainder either smoking or
sniﬃng. By contrast, only 1% had been regular users of opiates before
enlistment. Against all expectations, after their return to the US, the
great majority of the sample simply ‘gave up’ addiction; in the ﬁrst year
after return, only 5% of those who had been addicted in Vietnam were
addicted in the US; and despite reports of withdrawal symptoms, fully
88% had not resumed regular use of opiates at a 3-year follow-up point.
This did not occur because drugs were unavailable after return home;
interviewees reported that they knew how to obtain heroin and some
had occasionally, but not regularly, used. The main reasons inter-
viewees gave for this dramatic change in behaviour were that they now
considered heroin use ‘sordid’, high prices, and the fear of arrest. The
main predictor of re-addiction was a history of addiction prior to en-
tering the service.
Nor was it the case that treatment after discharge contributed to low
rates of re-addiction; only a very small proportion of those addicted in
Vietnam entered treatment after returning home and this group had a
much higher incidence of relapse than those not in treatment and as
high a relapse rate as those in treatment in the civilian population.
Remission did not necessarily involve abstinence. Although nearly
half the men addicted in Vietnam tried opiates again after return, only
6% overall became re-addicted. On this point, Robins (1993) com-
ments: “This surprising rate of recovery even when re-exposed to nar-
cotic drugs ran counter to the conventional wisdom that heroin is a
drug which causes addicts to suﬀer intolerable craving that rapidly
leads to re-addiction if re-exposed to the drug” (p. 1046).
In case it is thought that the majority of these young men were not
really addicted to opiates in Vietnam but were merely casual or ‘re-
creational’ users, it should be noted that a subsample who had failed a
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well-publicised urine test at departure (see Robins, 1993), and who
were therefore likely to have been frankly addicted, showed re-addic-
tion rates at follow-up of only 14%. Further, as stated, roughly 17%
were regular injectors in Vietnam. The fact that these groups showed
the same phenomenon of large-scale remission on return home conﬁrms
that these ﬁndings are relevant to addiction at any level of severity.
There are, of course, several ways in which these remarkable
ﬁndings might be explained. The most obvious candidate is that high
rates of heroin use and addiction in Vietnam had to do with the stress
of combat and the hardship of service conditions; once this stress was
removed, the escapist attractions of drug eﬀects were removed too.
Alternatively, from an economic perspective, the cheap and easy
availability of drugs in Vietnam could have been the main factor,
and high prices was given by respondents at follow-up as one of the
reasons for cessation or marked reduction of use. Or it could have been
the absence of cues associated with drug use in the home environment,
including the absence of peer example and pressure, that was
mainly responsible for change. Whatever the favoured explanation,
the ﬁndings of the Vietnam veterans follow-up clearly present
grave diﬃculties for any account of addiction with compulsion at its
centre and particularly for those accounts in which long-term neuro-
biological changes are alleged to give rise to compulsive behaviour or
experience. If compulsion is an essential characteristic of addiction,
why did it disappear, and apparently so easily, when addicted
servicemen returned home? Can it be imagined that someone
suﬀering from OCD in Vietnam would recover merely by returning to
the US?
5.7. Rat Park
In his popular book presenting a radically new perspective on ad-
diction to the general reader, Hari (2015) claims that two studies
during the 20th Century have changed, or should have changed, our
current view of addiction. The ﬁrst of these is the Vietnam veterans
follow-up which we have just considered; the second is a series of la-
boratory experiments on rats carried out by Bruce Alexander and his
colleagues during the late 1970s (Alexander, Coambs, & Hadaway,
1978; Alexander et al., 1985), which we will consider now. Largely
ignored at the time of their publication, the signiﬁcance of Alexander's
ﬁndings is recently becoming widely appreciated.
It is ﬁrst essential to understand the context of animal research on
addiction against which the signiﬁcance of this work should be seen.
Following the ground-breaking report by Olds and Milner (1954) that
rats will press a lever, to the point of exhaustion and sometimes death,
to obtain electrical stimulation in the so-called ‘reward centre’ of the
brain, Bozarth and Wise (1981), in an another famous experiment,
showed that rats will show similarly extreme and ‘compulsive’ lever-
pressing to obtain injections of morphine in the same brain region. This
was taken by many to be a striking demonstration of the compulsivity
of addiction. More generally, the escalation of self-administration of
various substances by isolated, caged rats in preference to food and
water and, again, sometimes to the point of death, was seen as a neat
animal model of compulsive human drug-taking.
What Alexander and his coworkers did in a typical experiment was
simply to take so-called morphine-addicted rats out of their isolated
cages and put them in a spacious, naturalistic setting, complete with
wheels and coloured balls, where they could play, have sex, nest and
reproduce. In this situation, the rats mostly preferred plain water to
morphine-laced water, even when they visibly experienced withdrawal
symptoms and even when the morphine-laced water was sweetened to
make it more palatable to them (Hari, 2015).
There has subsequently been much research, typically conducted
under the more controlled conditions favoured by experimenters, that
conﬁrms Alexander's main ﬁndings. For example, several studies have
shown that concurrently available, non-drug alternative reinforcers can
signiﬁcantly decrease cocaine-maintained behaviour in laboratory
animals (e.g., Carroll, Lac, & Nygaard, 1989; Nader &Woolverton,
1992). Ahmed (2010) has called the fact that, in standard drug self-
administration settings, animals have no choice but drug use a ‘vali-
dation crisis’ in animal models of addiction. It will also be obvious that
these ﬁndings from animal research are perfectly in line with studies of
operant behaviour in humans and of contingency management pro-
grammes reviewed above. They conﬁrm the basic principle of beha-
vioural economic theory that emitted behaviour is a function of the
alternative behavioural options (see Vuchinich &Heather, 2003).
It is tempting to see the Rat Park experiments as a metaphor for the
relationship between rates of human addiction and social and economic
deprivation; there is good evidence that addiction, together with mental
health problems, is associated with low socioeconomic status (see
Pickard & Ahmed, 2017). For marginalised people from underprivileged
backgrounds the beneﬁts of drug use may seem to exceed the costs on a
realistic evaluation of life circumstances and the limited alternatives
available to them. While evidence clearly shows that, in the natural
environment, the majority of those addicted to illicit drugs mature out
in their early 30s (see above), more chronic addiction is shown mainly
by those who also suﬀer from comorbid psychopathology and who lack
personal, social and economic capital. Be that as it may, the evidence
from the Rat Park and other experiments shows that the idea of com-
pulsion in addiction is extremely problematic even in nonhuman ani-
mals.
5.8. The nature of addictive relapse
There would be wide agreement among those involved in treating
addiction that the main diﬃculty lies not in initiating the desired be-
haviour change but in preventing relapse after the client's change in
behaviour has been made (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). At ﬁrst sight, the
statement that addiction is a relapsing condition might seem to conﬂict
with data summarised above on high rates of natural recovery and
‘maturing out’ in the common addictions (see Heyman, 2009, 2013;
Heyman &Mims, 2017). This problem is more apparent than real.
Though rates of natural recovery are much higher than would be ex-
pected from a ‘chronic brain disease’ perspective and though many
addicts do mature out at relatively early ages, they may still experience
great diﬃculty and a number of failures before doing so. With regard to
smoking, for example, Borland, Parros, Yong, Cummings, and Hyland
(2012) found that about 40% of smokers in four English–speaking
countries reported making a quit attempt each year and over two at-
tempts on average. Their data suggest that, by the age of 40, the
average smoker may have made 25 failed quit attempts (see Borland,
2014, p. 41). It is part of the folk wisdom on addiction that, while many
eventually succeed, smoking and other addictive behaviours are very
diﬃcult habits to break.
For theoretical purposes, craving and relapse are often considered to
be the two cardinal features of addiction that require explanation (e.g.,
Robinson & Berridge, 1993). It therefore behoves any theoretical ac-
count of addiction, such as the proposal that compulsion is the key
pathology in addiction, that it can contribute to an explanation of re-
lapse. We can ask, then, whether it makes sense to think of relapse to
addictive behaviour after a substantial period of abstinence or con-
trolled use in terms of a compulsion to re-engage in the behaviour.
The ﬁrst diﬃculty such an account faces is evidence that some re-
lapses are planned, in the sense of a decision being made to resume use
at some speciﬁed time or event in the future. The most obvious example
of this is the well-documented phenomenon of someone deliberately
stopping intake of disulﬁram some time before they have decided to
resume drinking (Liskow, Nickel, Tunley, Powell, & Penick, 1990).
(Drinking within a week of stopping disulﬁram is likely to result in the
highly unpleasant disulﬁram ethanol reaction [DER} and it is pre-
sumably awareness of this that led these individuals to plan their re-
lapse for when the chance of the DER had receded.) In addition to this
example, Saunders and Allsop (1989, p. 18) mention other instances of
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planned relapse and also reports of relapse in which people chose not to
deploy skills that were in their repertoire and which they had pre-
viously employed successfully to cope with high-risk relapse situations.
While these examples cause problems for a compulsion account of
addictive relapse, they clearly represent only a minority of relapses.
Unfortunately, there seems to be little research or analysis in the lit-
erature that could be used to estimate the relative contributions of non-
conscious and automatic inﬂuences on the one hand and conscious
decision-making on the other to the relapse process. However, here is a
quote from a leading researcher on nicotine addiction:
For smoking at least, most relapses are to some degree deliberative
(executive choices). A small percentage start out with automated
smoking but even here the decision to not recover is a deliberative
one. In most cases it is a choice made after a struggle, but in others
the person feels worn down and decides it is not worth the eﬀort, so
decides to give up or to put themselves in a position where they
think they will slip (to provide an excuse). This is because for nearly
all of us persistent self-control in the face of challenge is just too
hard (Borland, 2016).
Certainly, in the most inﬂuential model of the relapse process and
relapse prevention treatment by Marlatt and Gordon (1985), while it
is possible that a lapse (i.e., the initial use of a substance after ab-
stinence or moderation) may be partly precipitated by an automatic
response to conditioned cues, the transition from lapse to relapse in-
volves cognitive processes in which the decision to continue use is
mediated by the individual's outcome expectancies for the eﬀects of
the substance and the ‘abstinence violation eﬀect’. The main role for
non-conscious processes in relapse may be the possible existence of
‘apparently irrelevant decisions’ - those decisions made without con-
scious awareness that the resulting behaviour renders the occurrence
of a high-risk situation more likely and a relapse more probable
(Marlatt & Gordon, 1985, p. 49 et seq). Unfortunately again, though
based presumably on clinical insights, no research appears to have
tested this hypothesis.
An inﬂuential reconceptualisation of the relapse process by
Witkiewitz and Marlatt (2004), concluding that it is more complex and
unpredictable than previously thought, could be interpreted as allowing
a more prominent role for automatic processes but, once more, sub-
sequent theory and research have failed to clarify this issue. Another
possibility is the existence of ‘absent-minded relapses’ postulated by
Tiﬀany (1990) (see above) in which relapse occurs automatically
without the conscious awareness or intention of the person concerned.
Again, however, there seems to have been no research that might throw
light on this possibility. The conclusion can only be that evidence on the
nature of relapse causes diﬃculties for the validity of the compulsion
concept in addiction, at least for the strong version of the concept ap-
pealing to automatic processes.
5.9. Addicts' self-reports
Much of the evidence taken to support the existence of compulsion
in addiction is from the self-reports of addicts who say that they can't
help behaving the way they do, can't resist the temptation to use drugs
or engage in other addictive behaviours, etc. This evidence is often used
by proponents of the compulsion concept to bolster their case for its
essential role in addiction. For example, in referring to the eﬀects of
damage to the orbitofrontal cortex in laboratory animals, leading to
perseveration and resistance to extinction of reward-associated beha-
viours, Volkow and Fowler (2000) say, “This is reminiscent of what
happens to drug addicts who frequently claim that once they start
taking the drug they cannot stop even when the drug is no longer
pleasurable” (p. 319). As Pickard (2016) has pointed out, however,
‘can't’ can have multiple meanings:
When addicts say they “can't” resist, they may not be claiming that it
is literally impossible for them to resist but rather that abstinence is
very diﬃcult, and that the costs of foregoing drugs are high, and the
beneﬁts of using drugs are many … the testimony of addicts, like
other forms of self-report, is a complicated form of evidence for use
in theorizing (p. 457, italics original).
In similar vein and as an illustration of this point, Heather (1998)
writes:
If you ask someone to a party and they reply that they can't come,
they presumably mean that other commitments, duties, obligations
etc. prevent them from coming. They do not mean that they are
physically unable to attend or, with any useful meaning, that they
experience a compulsion to do something else. They mean that,
given the prevailing circumstances they feel obliged to choose,
perhaps very reluctantly, not to come. This is surely what drug users
mean when they say they can't resist taking drugs. However painful
or diﬃcult it may be to choose not to take them, this remains
nevertheless a possible option and one which addicts do sometimes
choose and maintain (p. 6).7
An ingenious experiment by Davies and Baker (1987) is relevant to
this issue. They gave a sample of 20 adult male heroin users in Glasgow
two parallel forms of a questionnaire separated by 10 to 14 days. The
questionnaires were typical of those used in studies of drug-taking be-
haviour and included items on drug consumption, attitudes towards
drug-taking, and reasons for drug use. The ﬁrst interview was carried
out by a 26-year-old locally-known male heroin user who presented
himself as having been recruited by a nearby university to help carry
out interviews; the second was conducted by a 40-year-old ‘straight’
(non-drug-using) interviewer who presented himself as a researcher
from the university. Subjects received a diﬀerent version of the ques-
tionnaire on each occasion and the two forms were presented as be-
longing to two separate studies with no connection with each other.
The results of this experiment showed that regular heroin users
consistently presented themselves as heavier users and as being more
addicted when interviewed by the ‘straight’ interviewer than when
interviewed by the known heroin user. In the latter case, they gave the
impression of having more choice and greater control over their drug
use. The diﬀerences between the two sets of interview responses were
substantial and clearly showed that people who use heroin will present
themselves very diﬀerently depending on the person interviewing them
and the circumstances in which they are interviewed. This not to imply
that these drug users were telling lies to one interviewer and not to the
other but it is to assert that, “People are able to construct their ex-
planations on the basis of their knowledge and experience of the at-
tributions that others are likely to make about them; and when this
occurs, attribution may be said to have a strategic component” (Davies,
1997. p. 122).8 The main point for present purposes is simply that self-
reports of addicts that they are or feel compelled to engage in addictive
behaviour should be taken with a sizeable pinch of salt. More research
involving deeper investigation of the meaning of addicts' self-reports
and further conceptual analysis of such reports would be useful.
Meanwhile, it would be instructive to carry out a similar experiment
with OCD patients, with interviews conducted by a psychiatrist in a
white coat or by a fellow suﬀerer. Although some diﬀerences in re-
ported behaviour and experiences might emerge, it is surely highly
unlikely that they would diﬀer suﬃciently in a way that would have
implications for how the condition should be described and understood.
7 I am grateful to John B. Davies for suggesting this example to me.
8 Other research by Davies and his colleagues supports the view that what people say
about drug use very much depends on whom they are talking to and in what context
rather than reﬂecting any underlying objective state, neurophysiological, socio-psycho-
logical, or otherwise. See Heather & Segal (2015, p.79).
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6. Discussion
There will now be an attempt to integrate the material in the various
sections of this article - to put together the lessons that can be derived
from various deﬁnitions and characterisations of compulsion, from the
comparison of compulsion in addiction and in OCD, from the roles
compulsion plays in neurobiological theories of addiction, and from the
various strands of evidence that seem prima facie to cause diﬃculties for
the idea that compulsion is an essential feature of addiction.
6.1. Yawning gaps in the literature on addiction
The ﬁrst and unavoidable conclusion from this exercise is there
exists a huge gap between, on the one hand, accounts of compulsion in
the medical literature on addiction as a disease and in neurobiological
theories of addiction and, on the other hand, evidence based on direct
observation of addicts' behaviour, both experimental and naturalistic,
participant observation and addicts' self-reports of their addictive be-
haviour and recoveries, epidemiological evidence on the course of ad-
diction, and other lines of evidence with similar implications. This large
and varied body of evidence shows that addictive behaviour cannot
reasonably be described as compulsive at the time it is carried out. And it
is this evidence that seems to be entirely neglected in the disease and
neurobiological literatures. This is the ‘simple and straightforward
sense’ of compulsion that was referred to above as being contradicted
by the evidence reviewed. This is not to say that it would necessarily be
impossible to accommodate such evidence in some kind of psychiatric
or neurobiological account of compulsion, only that it must be a con-
tinuing obstacle to progress in understanding addiction from a disease/
neurobiological perspective that the evidence in question should con-
tinue to be ignored.
A related gap is the familiar one between accounts of addiction
based on nonhuman animals and those based on human participants.
There are good reasons to believe that depictions of compulsion in
addiction derived from the behaviour of rats in conﬁned and isolated
cages with lever-pressing as the only response option available to them
bear little resemblance to human addictive behaviour in the real world.
The same can even be said of the behaviour of rats themselves when
they are freed from those conﬁning conditions and placed in environ-
ments more like those their fellow creatures inhabit in the wild, as
demonstrated by the rightly celebrated experiments by Bruce Alexander
and his colleagues (Alexander et al., 1978, 1985). Again, no depiction
of compulsion in addiction worthy of serious consideration can aﬀord
to brush these contrasts aside.
Yet another gap in the literature lies between accounts of compul-
sion founded on the presumed functions of areas and circuits in the
human brain, whether based on neuroimaging or otherwise, and com-
pulsion as behaviour or experience. It must always be remembered that
compulsion is a behavioural and/or experiential phenomenon, not
some aspect of brain activity. Arguments for compulsion in addiction in
neurobiological theories, although diﬀering considerably as we have
seen between diﬀerent theories, are all based on changes in brain
function after chronic ingestion of psychoactive drugs (or perhaps
longstanding engagement in some non-drug activities like gambling)
but that is not enough to warrant the term compulsion being applied to
those changes (cf. Stephens & Graham, 2009). On this point, Heyman
and Mims (2017) write:
The proper question is not whether drugs change the brain, but
whether they change the brain so that drug use is no longer vo-
luntary. This is a behavioural question that can only be answered by
studying the natural history of drug use. To determine whether drug
addicts are compulsive drug users, we need to know what inﬂuences
drug use in those who meet agreed-upon criteria for addiction. If the
factors are similar to those that aﬀect voluntary actions, then drug
use in addicts remains voluntary, albeit irrational and self-
destructive (p. 389).
One would only add that other types of evidence are relevant to this
issue besides natural history and that addicts' reports of their experi-
ence as well as their behaviour must be taken into account in evaluating
the utility of the compulsion concept.
6.2. Many meanings of compulsion
Another obvious lesson from the material covered is that there are
many meanings of compulsion in the literature and that Segal (2017a)
is correct to say that diﬀerent authors mean diﬀerent things by the
term. This is shown by diﬀerences, even within the same neurobiolo-
gical theory, between the strong sense of compulsion, referring to an
automatic force outside the agent's motivational resources, and what
we have termed here the weak sense, referring to the eﬀects of powerful
desires and temptations. This is a distinction based in ancient philoso-
phical writings and replicated by deﬁnitions in modern dictionaries; it
represents an important conceptual clariﬁcation of uses of the term,
compulsion for scientiﬁc purposes (Stephens & Graham, 2009; Wallace,
2003; Watson, 1999) but one that has yet to be taken fully on board by
scientists and scholars interested in addiction. (It is possible, of course,
that both kinds of compulsion apply simultaneously to addiction but, if
so, this should be clearly stated.)
Beyond strong and weak versions, this article has revealed many
other possible meanings of ‘compulsion’ and ‘compulsive’ as applied to
addiction and some of them will be examined below. There are also
meanings that have not yet been mentioned and some of these will be
brieﬂy discussed in what follows. Perhaps even worse than confusion
and inconsistency in what compulsion means is a failure to specify what
it means at all. This charge can be levelled at some authors, both in the
disease and non-disease camps, who seem to employ the term only
because it is a conventional way of characterising addiction but without
any further meaning than that. The clear conclusion from all this is that
scientists and scholars who apply the term compulsion to addiction,
either as an explanation or a description (see below), should clearly
specify what they mean by reference to some property of addictive
behaviour or experience. This applies to both disease and non-disease
accounts of compulsion.
6.3. Compulsion in addiction and in OCD
A conclusion from the material covered in this article is that,
whatever meaning can justiﬁably be given to compulsion in addiction,
it should bear little resemblance to compulsion in OCD. The observa-
tions made on this issue by Caetano (1985) over 30 years ago have been
substantially conﬁrmed by the review of evidence here relevant to the
question whether compulsion is a property of addictive behaviour and
experience and the further question whether this evidence could be said
to apply to compulsion in OCD, i.e., whether suﬀerers from OCD would
be likely to show the same apparently voluntary behaviour, or changes
in behaviour, in response to experimental or naturalistic conditions as
addicted individuals do. The answer is clearly no. This is important
because it is sometimes asserted, without much evidence or argument
to support it, that compulsion in addiction and in OCD are manifesta-
tions of the same underlying biological or psychological process. We
have encountered very little support for this hypothesis and many
reasons to doubt it.
6.4. So is addiction just an ordinary choice?
A great deal of evidence of diﬀerent kinds was reviewed above to
show that addictive behaviour cannot reasonably be described as
compulsive at the time it is carried out. A possible deduction from this
is simply that, rather than being compelled, so-called addictive beha-
viour represents a free choice just like other, ordinary, everyday
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choices; indeed, this deduction has been made (e.g., Schaler, 2000).
This view would be based directly on the copious evidence that ad-
dictive behaviour was operant behaviour and therefore voluntary, that
treatment based on the principles of contingency management was
probably the most successful ever documented and, perhaps more in-
directly, on the other types of evidence summarised. It could even be
further deduced that, since what is called addictive behaviour is not
compelled but voluntary, addiction itself is a myth (Davies, 1997).
This does not follow from the evidence presented and is certainly
not the position taken in this essay. Given the long history of the topic
of addiction and the countless reports people give of problems they
experience in regulating their behaviour in relation to the consumption
of substances or engagement in activities, it is inconceivable that ad-
dictive choices are just ordinary choices and that no puzzle exists to
warrant a special term like addiction or dependence. Ordinary choices
people make are sometimes, perhaps often, irrational but addictive
behaviour can be so extremely irrational and so self-destructive that it
is diﬃcult to believe that the choices leading to it are ordinary ones.
Anyone who has worked in services aimed at helping people with ad-
dictive disorders knows that their clients have typically resolved on
numerous occasions to desist from an unwanted behaviour but have
failed time and again to do so (see Heather, 2017a). This simple ob-
servation alone is suﬃcient to show that addictive behaviour exists and
that addictive choices are not ordinary choices.
Now, how this brief justiﬁcation can be reconciled with the evi-
dence presented above demonstrating the voluntary nature of addictive
behaviour at the time it is carried out is another question and one which
is beyond the remit of the present article fully to attempt to answer.
Suﬃce to say that this is the major issue facing addiction studies at the
present time and one to the possible solution of which a recent col-
lection has been dedicated (Heather & Segal, 2017). The truth about
addiction lies somewhere between the extremes of free choice and no
choice but where exactly that place is, and how it should be described,
is the crucial issue. To provide one sketchy possibility, it could be that
addicts respond to incentives and so are free to choose to use or not to
use at any one time, but that their autonomy is impaired when their
pattern of choices is considered over time. From this perspective, ad-
diction is marked by dynamic inconsistency and is a disorder of choice
in the sense of a failure to make consistent choices over time (see
Heather, 2017b, p. 465; Levy, 2006).
Another interesting conjecture, and one with similarities to the
above, has recently been proposed by Noggle (2016). This begins with
the idea of ‘ego depletion’ (Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Muraven, & Tice,
1998), according to which willpower is a limited resource that becomes
depleted by use; we can resist temptation for a while but not in-
deﬁnitely. Applied to addiction, the implication is that addictive
craving and urges persist long enough to deplete the addict's willpower,
leading to relapse (cf. Levy, 2006). Thus drug cravings are irresistible,
not in the obvious sense that they cannot be resisted at any one time but
in the weaker sense that the ability to resist is worn down and even-
tually fails over time (Taylor, 2005). Noggle's original contribution is to
suggest that the persistence of the desire to consume drugs among ad-
dicts is a signiﬁcant form of dysfunction in its own right and one that
makes an important contribution to compulsivity. More speciﬁcally,
addiction involves dysfunction in a mechanism that normally prevents a
person from being tempted to consume drugs “in situations where such
consumption poses a grave, obvious, and imminent danger to things
that they care about—things like their careers, their family, their
health, their freedom, their self-respect” (p. 218). When desire to con-
sume drugs in such situations occurs in a non-addict, a ‘quashing me-
chanism’ usually either blocks the formation of the motivation to con-
sume or eliminates it soon after it forms. By contrast, the addict's
motivation to consume drugs often persists even when it is obvious that
consumption invites dangerous or repugnant consequences. Noggle
summarises his hypothesis as follows:
… the apparent compulsivity of addiction is a product of three main
facts: First, due to the eﬀect of chronic drug use on the dopamine-
based reward system, the addict experiences a motivation to con-
sume drugs that is abnormally strong, though not so strong as to be
strongly irresistible. Second, these abnormally strong motivations to
consume often fail to be quashed, so that the addict continues to be
tempted to consume even in situations where doing so poses a high
risk of disaster. Third, the ability to resist a persistent motivatio-
n—especially a strong one—is limited (p. 222).
Noggle's (2016) ideas are of interest here because they exemplify an
account of compulsivity that concedes that drug use in the addict can be
voluntary at the time it is carried out, and that drug craving need not be
irresistible, while at the same time suggesting a mechanism by which
addictive behaviour, and relapse, becomes more likely over time. If
validated by further analysis and research, it may be a sense of com-
pulsion with use in the understanding of addiction.
6.5. The minimal version of compulsion in addiction
In the Introduction, we encountered a deﬁnition of compulsion that
relied only on the fact that addicts continue to show diminished ability
to control drug use even in the face of adverse consequences that should
motivate cessation “in a rational agent willing and able to exert control
over behavior” (Hyman, 2007, p. 2). This was therefore dubbed a
minimal version of compulsion in addiction. In similar vein, Everitt
(2014) writes:
It is indeed compulsive drug use that is widely seen as a core aspect
of addiction, and by that is meant repeated, persistent use, despite
placing an individual in danger, compromising their health, family
and social lives (p. 6).
This minimal deﬁnition seems to be a restatement in other language
of the central puzzle of addiction that people continue to behave in
ways that are bad for them or, more pertinently, in ways they know are
bad for them. It does not get us any further in understanding or ex-
plaining this puzzle, or even in approaching an understanding of it,
merely to call the behaviour in question compulsive.
Even as a description of compulsion, this minimal deﬁnition seems
no advance on the traditional and more descriptive term ‘loss of control’
or, at least, the more reﬁned version, ‘impaired control’, including
Edwards' (1982) control that is “variably or intermittently impaired
rather than lost”. Further, as Heyman and Mims (2017) point out:
“Modern, research-based choice theory predicts semi-stable suboptimal
outcomes. Thus, it is possible to explain why addiction is self-destruc-
tive, yet signiﬁcantly correlated with its consequences” (p. 403). The
fact of self-destructive consequences of drug use is not inconsistent with
the assumption that addicts make choices; after all, we speak naturally
of ‘self-destructive choices’. Choices need not be rational but the task is
to explain why addicts' choices are self-destructive, even variably or
intermittently so. In short, in their deﬁnitions above, Hyman (ex-
plicitly) and Everitt (implicitly) confuse compulsion with irrationality.
The conclusion is that, to be useful, the concept of compulsion in ad-
diction needs to refer to something more than the fact of self-destruc-
tive addictive behaviour.
6.6. Could compulsion apply to some addicts and not to others?
In a section on the nature of recovery from addiction above, we
encountered the suggestion that there may be a subset of individuals
labelled as suﬀering from addiction to whom the concept of compulsion
was applicable and another subset to whom it was not or, at least, in
whom it was present in a milder form. The principal diﬀerence between
these subsets was thought to be the severity of their addiction, assessed
for example by the number of DSM-IV-TR criteria they met (Segal,
2017a). If valid, such a distinction might explain the diﬀerence between
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the low rates of recovery shown by addicts in treatment compared with
much higher rates in those in the natural environment who had not
received or sought treatment. This hypothesis would have to be com-
pared with an alternative that invoked the higher level of psychiatric
comorbidity in the treatment than in the non-treatments populations
(Heyman, 2009). Lastly, the existence of the less severe subset could
explain why diagnosed addicts appeared responsive to normal in-
centives in laboratory experiments, the assumption being that such
addicts did not show the severe form of addiction that involved com-
pulsion. With regard to the success of contingency management pro-
grammes, Noggle (2016) has pointed out that, while 80–90% of the
professionals treated in the PHP and similar programmes successfully
abstained, 10–20% did not “even though they knew that consuming
threatened careers in which they had made great personal investment”
(p. 214). It is possible that this minority typiﬁed the more severe kind of
addict for whom compulsion to use rendered incentives for abstinence
less eﬀective.
It should be remarked that the hypothesis of a more severe subset
of addicts who show compulsion contradicts the well-known WHO
(1969) deﬁnition in which compulsion is said to be always present.
This raises the possibility that the less severe subset without com-
pulsion or with a less destructive form of it, if it exists, should be
labelled as suﬀering from some milder disorder than addiction. The
hypothesis might also have diﬃculty with other kinds of evidence
reviewed in this article, particularly that from the follow-up of
Vietnam veterans. However, the main point in bringing these ob-
servations forward here is simply to suggest that research is needed
into these important speculations.
6.7. Compulsion as an explanation of addiction
We turn now to those deﬁnitions and meanings of compulsion in
which it signiﬁes something more than continued use despite negative
consequences, i.e., compulsive use despite negative consequences. In
particular, we shall focus on the two senses of compulsion that have
been identiﬁed in this essay – the strong version in which compulsion is
seen as an example of automatic, involuntary behaviour following re-
peated learning experiences and the weak, motivationally-based ver-
sion in which it is seen as resulting from a failure to resist abnormally
strong desires to engage in addictive behaviour. Further, we shall
consider each version of compulsion both as an explanation and as a
description of addiction, beginning with explanation here.9 This will be
applied both to addictive behaviour and addictive experience. Lastly, in
each case we will evaluate the usefulness of both the strong and weak
versions of compulsion. The intersections of explanation or description,
behaviour or experience, and strong or weak kinds of compulsion are
shown in Table 2, together with a rough verdict in each of the eight
cells.
6.7.1. Explanations of addictive behaviour: strong version
Recall that the strong version of compulsion in addiction refers to a
force outside the person's motivational states, like Aristotle's wind that
blows someone along the street or like being thrown bodily out of a
night club by a bouncer (cf. Watson, 1999). As Stephens and Graham
(2009) say, we should think of an internal state analogous to such
forces as what is sometimes proposed as compulsion in addiction –
something pictured “as bypassing the will altogether, causing us to do
things that do not satisfy the minimal conditions of voluntariness”
(Wallace, 2003, p. 424).
The outstanding example of such an explanation is by Everitt and
Robbins (2005), summarised above, in which addiction is said to
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9 At the risk of stating the obvious, an explanation in science diﬀers from a description
in that it claims to demonstrate a cause for the phenomenon in question, while a de-
scription makes no such claim.
N. Heather Addictive Behaviors Reports 6 (2017) 15–38
32
consist of non-conscious, involuntary behaviour formed by overlearned
S-R habit connections and under the control of the part of the brain (the
dorsal striatum) that regulates automatic behaviour like car-driving by
an experienced driver. An analogy is with persistent or constant re-in-
itiation of skills like playing the piano or tying one's shoelace.
This explanation is ﬂatly contradicted by the evidence on addicts'
actual, as opposed to stereotyped and imagined, behaviour examined
above. This is most obviously true from accounts by Neale (2002) and
many others of the ﬂexibility, ingenuity and sheer ordinariness of ad-
dicts' behaviour in the real world. It can also be inferred from the
ﬂexibility of behaviour shown by the alcohol addicts in the laboratory
experiments by Mendelson, Mello and others and, overall, by the large
volume of research of diﬀerent kinds showing that addictive behaviour
and recovery is responsive to environmental conditions. As conceded
above, repetitive and seemingly ‘automatic’ behaviour might apply to
acts of consuming substances or engaging in addictive activities but
even that depiction may have been exaggerated and, in any event, it is
easy for someone to become aware of such habitual behaviour and
change it if necessary (Wallace, 2003). Lastly, relapse to addictive be-
haviour after periods of abstinence or moderation, which is the main
obstacle to permanent behaviour change, is unlikely to be due to au-
tomatic processes. Thus, this theory cannot account for drug-seeking or
relapse in addictive behaviour. The same inadequacies apply to other
theories, such as those of Koob and Le Moal (2001) and Goldstein and
Volkow (2002), that propose similar kinds of automaticity as explana-
tions of drug-seeking behaviour and relapse.
6.7.2. Explanations of addictive experience: strong version
Since the strong version of compulsion has just been shown to be
inadequate as an explanation of addictive behaviour, it follows that it is
inadequate as an explanation of addictive experience too. It makes no
sense to imagine an extrapersonal and non-conscious mechanism that
does not aﬀect one's behaviour but somehow aﬀects one's experience.
However, the strong version of compulsion may have some relevance to
the description of addictive experience (see below).
6.7.3. Explanations of addictive behaviour: weak version
To recap, the weak version of compulsion in addiction refers to the
eﬀects of strong desires or impulses etc. to which the addict is subject.
As an explanation, therefore, the proposal is that powerful desires,
urges, cravings or other motivating feelings or sensations cause addicts
compulsively to carry out addictive behaviour contrary to their better
judgement, against their considered evaluations or, in short, against
their wills. To distinguish it from the non-motivational kind of com-
pulsion we have been considering above. Watson (1999) calls this
simply ‘motivational compulsion’.
The outstanding example of a theory that invokes this kind of
compulsion to explain addictive behaviour is Robinson and Berridge's
(1993) incentive-sensitisation theory. As we saw above, a neuro-adap-
tive process known as incentive sensitisation is hypothesised to trans-
form ordinary desires for drug experiences into drug craving and is also
responsible for relapse to drug use after abstinence. This ‘drug wanting’,
as opposed to ‘drug liking’, results in compulsive drug-taking and
–seeking even when the expectation of drug pleasure is reduced and
even in the face of strong disincentives. This hypothesised process
clearly ﬁts the requirements of the motivational kind of compulsion
described in the philosophical literature (e.g., Stephens & Graham,
2009). There is a slight complication here in that incentive sensitisation
itself can be implicit, outside the addict's awareness, and it might
therefore be thought to be an automatic process similar to that de-
scribed by Everitt and Robbins (2005). This would be a mistake,
however, because, although often non-conscious, incentive sensitisation
is part of the person's motivational inclinations and not linked to
learning and habit-formation.
This is not the place to attempt an overall evaluation of the scientiﬁc
validity of Robinson and Berridge's theory but a few remarks can be
made about the way it handles the issue of compulsion. The theory
seems to explain well some of the more curious aspects of addictive
behaviour, notably the excessive preoccupation with the object of ad-
diction, the fact that the behaviour is continued when the addict no
longer gains much pleasure from it, and why relapse sometimes occurs
after many years of abstinence. Most importantly, we know that addicts
do experience intense desires for the eﬀects of drugs or activities, al-
though whether such desires can coherently be said to cause addictive
behaviour is uncertain (see Wallace, 2003). Nevertheless, some variant
of the motivational basis for compulsion seems far more plausible as an
explanation than the strong, automatic version. However, the theory is
still embarrassed, like the other neurobiological theories, by the evi-
dence reviewed in this article, particularly the demonstration of pre-
ferences for alternative reinforcers, including those that convey ap-
parently quite small rewards, over drug consumption and the much
shorter course of most histories of addiction in the natural environment
than would be predicted by semi-permanent brain changes brought
about by incentive sensitisation.
Whether or not the theory can be modiﬁed to take account of this
evidence is hard to say. At the very least, it should recognise that the
causal link between drug wanting/craving and use/relapse is far from
inevitable and depends on environmental and situational variables to
an extent not yet captured by the theory. If such changes to the theory
were made, it may not be useful to continue to use the term ‘compul-
sion’ to describe the cause of addictive behaviour.
A more general version of the idea that the weak form of compul-
sion causes addictive behaviour is based on the well-attested phenom-
enon of conditioned craving, ﬁrst studied by Wikler (1965). Stimuli
associated with persistent drug use, such as the setting in which use
occurs, the people associated with it, drug-using paraphernalia or in-
ternal mood states preceding use, acquire conditioned properties and
the re-occurrence of such stimuli then motivates drug-taking. O'Brien,
Childress, Ehrman, and Robbins (1998) maintain that the chief sig-
niﬁcance of conditioned craving for compulsive behaviour is its role in
relapse after withdrawal symptoms have subsided. More recently,
Childress, Ehrman, Wang, et al. (2008) published the ﬁrst evidence that
brain reward circuitry responds to conditioned drug cues presented
outside awareness and believe that this “may represent a potential
vulnerability in disorders (e.g., the addictions) for whom poorly-con-
trolled appetitive motivation is a central feature” (p. 1506).
There is no question that conditioned craving occurs and that it
plays a part in the process of relapse. However, as we have seen, there is
evidence that relapse also involves a deliberative choice. The occur-
rence of conditioned craving does not lead inevitably or on its own to
relapse and should not therefore be construed as a form of compulsion.
6.7.4. Explanations of addictive experience: weak version
If the Robinson and Berridge (1993) theory is a valid explanation of
addictive behaviour, then incentive sensitisation and the resulting drug
wanting could cause the addict's experience of feeling driven to con-
tinue drug use or other addictive behaviour without understanding
their motivation for doing so and with an accompanying sense of be-
wilderment. It is also possible that conditioned cues occurring outside
awareness could contribute to the same eﬀect. Again, however, it would
have to be further explained why the feeling of being driven did not
always, depending on the circumstances, result in the addictive beha-
viour being carried out.
6.8. Compulsion as a description of addiction
Accurate descriptions are important because they form the data on
which explanations of phenomena are built. So, if addiction is proposed
as a disorder of compulsion, as opposed to a disorder of choice, de-
scriptions of the compulsive nature of addictive behaviour and ex-
perience must be veridical.
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6.8.1. Descriptions of addictive behaviour: strong version
The verdict here is the same as for explanations of addictive beha-
viour from the strong version of compulsion and for its representation
in neurobiological theories of addiction. Automaticity is descriptive of
the ritualised and ‘habitual’ aspects of the behaviour of drug addicts
and those addicted to non-drug activities. However, it is clearly con-
tradicted by observations of addictive seeking behaviour under la-
boratory and naturalistic conditions and by addicts' self-reports of their
behaviour and recoveries. It is further inconsistent with the natural
history of addiction inferred from random surveys of the general po-
pulation and from follow-ups of drugs users such as the Vietnam ve-
terans follow-up.
6.8.2. Descriptions of addictive experience: strong version
We saw above that Everitt and Robbins (2005) likened the per-
sisting quality of automatic S-R habits to a subjective state of ‘must do!’
and went on to say that “this subjective response could arise post hoc as
a rationalisation of the ‘out-of-control’ habitual behavior rather than
being the driving inﬂuence” (p. 1485). This raises an interesting pos-
sibility. In a discussion of the work of the American philosopher, Do-
nald Davidson and of the idea that addiction can be fruitfully seen as a
form of akrasia (i.e., weakness of will), Heather and Segal (2015) end by
repeating Davidson’ conclusion that the akrates (and therefore the ad-
dict) does not have a reason for preferring the akratic action to action
based on an all-things-considered judgement about what it would be
better to do; she cannot therefore tell us or herself why she broke her
resolution to refrain from behaviour she knows to be ill-advised. Hea-
ther and Segal continue:
This (not having a reason for the breakdown of a resolution) may
also represent a sense in which the addict reports feeling compelled
to engage in addictive behaviour—the subjective sense of not being
able to understand one's past behaviour and therefore feeling that
one must have been driven by some extrapersonal force to carry it
out. If one cannot understand why one has repeatedly done some-
thing one would rather not have done and, on the basis of past
evidence, is likely to continue doing, then one is likely to feel that
one was and is compelled to keep doing it (p. 81, parentheses
added).
The suggestion is that the addict's attempt to make sense of her
predicament results in her feeling as if she had been compelled by some
extrapersonal inﬂuence to behave addictively. This might be called a
sort of post hoc rationalisation of irrational, or more precisely, non-ra-
tional behaviour but, as Everitt and Robbins say, it has no causal force.
A similar kind of feeling as if compelled could arise from the addict's
realisation that he has ceased to gain much or any pleasure from his
addictive behaviour (Kennett, Matthews, & Snoek, 2013). If one keeps
doing something without gaining any pleasure from it, one will be in-
clined to think that one is compelled to do it.
6.8.3. Descriptions of addictive behaviour: weak version
As a description, compulsion arising from the existence of strong
desires, cravings, temptations etc. is not relevant to behaviour but only
to experience and this will be dealt with next.
6.8.4. Descriptions of addictive experience: weak version
We come at last to what is probably the most relevant sense of
compulsion to addiction or, at least, to a description of addictive ex-
perience. Since the very beginnings of the disease concept, desires to
consume substances or engage in behaviours have been described as
‘irresistible’ temptations or as ‘overpowering’ any resistance the person
might put up. We saw above that, in the light of the accumulated evi-
dence on the nature of addictive behaviour, this ‘weak’ version of
compulsion was inadequate as an explanation of addictive behaviour
and had only limited and speculative relevance to an explanation of
addictive experience. We shall consider here how it fares as a
description of addictive experience.
One of the most commonly cited passages in the literature on ad-
diction is the following anecdote from Dr. Benjamin Rush, the so-called
father of American psychiatry, reporting the words of one of his pa-
tients: “Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room, and were a cannon
constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from
passing before that cannon, in order to get at the rum” (Rush, 1812, p.
266).10 Other 19th Century anecdotes about inebriety include a man
who, while in treatment, secretly drank the alcohol from six jars con-
taining morbid specimens (Watson, 1999, p. 23) and another who re-
putedly chopped his hand oﬀ in order to be given brandy
(Holton & Berridge, 2017, p. 153). Such tales are reminiscent of Volkow
and Fowler's (2000) comparison with the hunger of starvation.
Do these anecdotes and analogies give a realistic portrayal of ad-
dictive desires? Watson (1999) is sceptical and so is the present au-
thor. The 19th Century anecdotes seem ﬁne examples of Victorian
melodrama and the more recent analogies appear similarly ex-
aggerated. This is not to deny that addictive desires, particularly after
periods of unwanted deprivation, are sometimes powerful, highly
distressing if unfulﬁlled and deserve the label ‘craving’. But such de-
sires cannot be literally irresistible or overpowering because, if they
were, “it would be an utter mystery how people ever succeed in
overcoming their addictive conditions by exercising strength of will,
and yet this seems to happen all the time” (Wallace, 2003, p. 425). It
should hardly be necessary to add that the notion of irresistible and
overpowering desires is inconsistent with the literature on the realities
of addictive behaviour and experience that was reviewed earlier in
this article.
From the point of view of their ego-depletion theory, Baumeister
and Vonasch (2015) put it this way:
We think the idea of being overwhelmed by irresistible urges is in-
accurate in most cases. Instead, there are frequent but weak im-
pulses. Many of these are resisted successfully, but some may
eventually be enacted. Frequent or chronic resistance can deplete
one's willpower, so that the addict yields to a weak impulse that he
or she would otherwise resist. In those cases, the lapse is caused not
by an overwhelmingly powerful impulse but by a temporarily low
level of willpower. The well documented patterns of increased re-
lapse during stress or dysphoria could also reﬂect the fact that the
person's resources have been depleted by coping with the stress or
problem (p. 7)
The only point of disagreement here is that, while urges to use may
be mild during ongoing addictive behaviour, they are sometimes, de-
pending on the context, much stronger and dangerous for relapse after a
periods of abstinence, when to use the vernacular the addict is ‘strung-
out’. This is especially true if the opportunity to use is perceived as
possible (Wertz & Sayette, 2001). Nevertheless, the main point is agreed
that, although desires, impulses, urges, cravings, etc. to engage in ad-
dictive behaviour are sometimes extremely diﬃcult and painful to re-
sist, resistance never becomes impossible in principle. It is also agreed
with Spada, Albery, and Moss (2015) that “the exercise of volition is not
lost to the automaticity and irresistibility of addictive responses, but
rather … can be employed to decide whether to comply and satisfy, or
to deny and abstain” (p. 7). These comments are consistent with a dual
process theory of addiction (see Heather, 2017b; Henden, 2017) but a
discussion of that is beyond the scope of the present article.
10 Some authors give the source of this quotation as William James (1890, p. 543).
Since the wording is identical, James must have borrowed the quotation from Rush's
(1812) book, curiously without acknowledgment. Harry Levine (1978) was responsible
for popularising the quote and its true origins among modern students of alcohol ad-
diction.
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6.9. The public understanding of addiction
Before ending this exploration of the concept of compulsion in ad-
diction, it is necessary to oﬀer a few remarks on implications for the
public understanding of addiction. We saw at the outset of this article
that the idea of compulsion served a socio-political function for the
disease concept of addiction by persuading policy-makers, opinion-
formers and the general public that addicts were not responsible for
their troublesome behaviour and should therefore be oﬀered compas-
sion and treatment rather than disapproval and punishment. The public
understanding is also important, not only for inﬂuencing the extent to
which public funds should be allocated to research on and treatment of
addiction, but also for the sense family members make of their loved
one's otherwise incomprehensible behaviour and for the sense addicts
themselves make of their own diﬃculties.
The philosopher of science, Ian Hacking (1986) has described the
existence of ‘human kinds’ that come about through the classiﬁcations
made by scientists of human aﬀairs, for example psychiatric classiﬁ-
cations. What distinguishes these human kinds from natural kinds is
that they have ‘looping eﬀects’ that change the people who are thus
classiﬁed. For present purposes and in simple terms, addicts come to
believe what is said about them in ‘oﬃcial’ pronouncements and then
behave accordingly. More generally, everything we know about the
eﬀects of ‘expectancy’ on human behaviour means that it is very diﬃ-
cult to underestimate how behaviour, say addictive behaviour, is
shaped by the cultural milieu in which it is embedded and how beha-
viour can change dramatically when those culturally-based expecta-
tions change.
For many years, the social psychologist, Stanton Peele has argued
that the disease concept of addiction and the treatment based on it have
the eﬀect of reducing addicts' chances of recovery by telling them that
they are powerless to change without special help (see Peele, 1985,
2017). Indeed, he believes that treatment founded on the idea that
addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain disease, implying thereby the
conceptual and treatment goal of eliminating choice in addiction and
recovery, is “not only futile, but iatrogenic” (Peele, 2017). Peele sees
the future of treatment for addiction as centred on the opposite goal of
encouraging choice and empowering people to change:
That people's belief in their capacity to change is the single greatest
factor in psychological and behavioural change is one of the un-
derlying principles of the modern cognitive behavioural therapy
movement, which has repeatedly been shown to be the most em-
pirically well supported therapy model. Self-empowering addiction
treatment is also in line with the modern drug policy reform
movement represented by harm reduction. As a movement, harm
reduction applies the values of choice, self-respect, and humanity to
the millions of people who confront the wide range of addictive
proclivities we all face in one way or another (Peele, 2016).
Many contemporary behavioural and social scientists, counsellors
and therapists would agree with Peele and there is much theory and
research to support his argument. Eﬃcacy expectancies, our belief in
our ability to master a speciﬁc change in behaviour, are the most im-
portant determinant of successful therapeutic and self-initiated change
according to the dominant theory of behaviour change during the
second half of the 20th Century (Bandura, 1997); increased self-eﬃcacy
is a sine qua non in the most inﬂuential model of relapse prevention
(Marlatt & Gordon, 1985); and, more generally, there is a large amount
of evidence that theories people have about themselves in which their
abilities are seen as malleable and capable of improvement are asso-
ciated with ‘mastery’ responses and greater levels of success in life than
self-theories in which abilities are seen as ﬁxed and unchangeable, and
associated with maladaptive ‘helpless’ responses (Dweck & Leggett,
1988).
In the present discussion of evidence bearing on the concept of
compulsion in addiction, it emerged that, in some meanings of the term,
compulsion could make sense of aspects of addiction and it might
therefore seem arbitrary whether or not the term should be retained.
Such a conclusion would ignore the impact of the public understanding
of addiction and, in particular, the eﬀects of the public-facing language
used to describe addiction on addicts' self-concepts and their conﬁdence
in their ability to overcome their problems. It seems very likely that the
language of compulsion, of automatic responses or of overpowering and
irresistible cravings is a strong disincentive to self-change and to the
success of treatment aimed at helping people change.
As Heyman and Mims (2017) have recommended, we need to bring
about a radical transformation in the public's understanding of addic-
tion, one in which they are persuaded to believe that breaking free from
addiction is possible and told what we know about how this can be
successfully accomplished.
7. Conclusions
The following conclusions from this review and discussion of the
usefulness of the concept of compulsion in addiction seem justiﬁed:
(i) There exists a large body of evidence of diﬀerent kinds – la-
boratory experiments with human and nonhuman participants,
evaluations of treatment methods, randomised population sur-
veys, follow-up studies of addicted persons, qualitative and eth-
nographic research, studies of relapse, analyses of addicts' self-
reports – appearing to show that, at the time it is carried out,
addictive behaviour is voluntary behaviour and not ‘against the
will’ of the addicted individual.
(ii) This body of evidence should not be ignored by scientists and
scholars who wish to defend the idea that compulsion is the es-
sential, or even an important, characteristic of addiction.
(iii) Many diﬀerent meanings of compulsion in addiction exist in the
literature and, while some interpretations of compulsion may
have some validity in the explanation or description of addiction,
those who use the concept should clearly specify what they mean
by it.
(iv) Evidence and analysis clearly suggest that compulsion in addic-
tion, in whatever form it is thought to take, is diﬀerent from its
manifestation in obsessive-compulsive disorder.
(v) Although inconsistent on the whole with addiction as a disorder
of compulsion, the evidence should not be interpreted as showing
that ‘addictive’ choices are ordinary choices just like any others.
The evidence can be accommodated within a theory of addiction
as a disorder of choice.
(vi) Philosophical analysis and modern dictionary deﬁnitions suggest
two diﬀerent versions of the compulsion concept that have po-
tential explanatory power: a strong version in which it takes the
form of an automatic, involuntary force outside the person's
motivational states, and a weak version in which it refers to the
eﬀects of abnormally strong desires, craving, or urges that are
diﬃcult or impossible to resist.
(vii) As an explanation of addiction in neurobiological theories (e.g.,
Everitt & Robbins, 2005), the strong version of compulsion, re-
ferring to involuntary, automatic, habitual learned behaviour,
might have some relevance to drug consumption but is contra-
dicted by evidence as an explanation of drug seeking and relapse.
(viii) As an explanation of addiction, the weak version of compulsion
referring to the eﬀects of strong desires (e.g.,
Robinson & Berridge, 1993) seems more plausible but needs
modiﬁcation to account fully for the evidence on addictive be-
haviour and recovery.
(ix) Neurobiological theories incorporating either versions of com-
pulsion might be able to explain the addict's feeling of being
driven to use drugs, the associated bewilderment and a post hoc
rationalisation as if compelled to take drugs.
(x) As a description of addictive experience, the weak version of
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compulsion, involving literally ‘irresistible’ temptation and
‘overpowering’ desires, has been exaggerated. Although cravings
in addiction are sometimes powerful and very diﬃcult to resist,
they are never impossible to resist in principle. The fact that some
addicts do not ever change their addictive behaviour is not evi-
dence that they cannot ever change it.
(xi) Although in some senses of the term it may seem arbitrary whe-
ther ‘compulsion’ should be retained, its use has important im-
plications for the public understanding of addiction and is likely
to deter people's attempts to overcome their problems and their
chances of success.
(xii) A transformation of public-facing communications on addiction is
needed in which people are persuaded to believe that breaking
free from addiction is possible and given the best available in-
formation on how it can be done.
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